COMMENTS

SPEAKING TRUTH TO POWER:
INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT IN AN IMPERFECT WORLD
DAVID EVERETT COLTONt

Since the United States assumed global responsibilities following
the two World Wars of this century, the nation has continually struggled to reconcile geopolitical responsibilities with its liberal democratic
values.1 One microcosm of this struggle is the structural challenge of
integrating secrecy and democracy.' The Iran-Contra episode,3 and
t B.A. 1984, University of Pennsylvania; M.A. 1988, Johns Hopkins School of
Advanced International Studies; J.D. Candidate 1989, University of Pennsylvania.
1 See R. OSGOOD, IDEALS AND SELF-INTEREST IN AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS: THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 437, 439
(1953) (noting that the "wise conduct of foreign relations must involve a continual
series of compromises with perfection," but "America's problem of reconciling its ideals
with its self-interest comes close to being a life-or-death matter"); see also INTELLIGENCE: POLICY AND PROCESS 6 (A. Maurer, M. Tunstall & J. Keagle eds. 1985)
[hereinafter POLICY AND PROCESS] ("Do Americans, like Hegel, believe that reason of
state is reason enough or, like Machiavelli, that the state should at least appear to act
in accord with high moral standards?"). This intellectual confusion has a direct impact
on perceptions about the role and utility of intelligence capabilities in American foreign
policy. As an example of one naive but not uncommon view, a Senate Committee investigating the CIA in the mid-1970s suggested that "traditional notions of fair play"
should guide American international behavior. See SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE, INTERIM
REPORT, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 258-59 (1976).
2 For a distinctly idiosyncratic interpretation of the American experience, see S.
TURNER, SECRECY AND DEMOCRACY: THE CIA IN TRANSITION 278-85 (1985) (arguing that the tensions that arise when a democracy engages in secret intelligence operations require more openness and the application of "just war" theory to intelligence).
But see Lockhart, Intelligence: A British View, in BRITISH AND AMERICAN APPROACHES TO INTELLIGENCE 37, 46 (K. Robertson ed. 1987) [hereinafter APPROACHES TO INTELLIGENCE] ("The essential skill of a secret intelligence service is to
get things done secretly and deniably."). For a comparative discussion of secret activities and Western democratic systems, see Godson, Intelligence: An American View: The
Uses and Limits of Intelligence, in APPROACHES TO INTELLIGENCE, supra, at 5-11.
See also W. LAQUEUR, A WORLD OF SECRETS 201-32 (1985) (describing the establishments in various Western states).

3 See HOUSE SELECT COMM. TO INVESTIGATE COVERT ARMS TRANSACTIONS
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earlier controversies such as the mining of Nicaraguan harbors' and
paramilitary support for the anti-communist forces in Nicaragua' are
recent examples of this long simmering struggle. Allegations of intelligence agency abuses were brought to the attention of the general public
in the early 1970s.' Since then, a stable solution to the conflict has
WITH IRAN AND SENATE SELECT COMM. ON SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO IRAN
AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION, REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES

INVESTIGATING THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR, S. REP. No. 216, H.R. REP. No.
100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) [hereinafter IRAN-CONTRA REPORT] (detailing the

433,
Reagan Administration's use of secret arms sales to Iran as a means of funding covert
assistance to anti-communist forces in Central America).
" See, e.g., CIA Views Minelaying Partof Covert "HoldingAction," Wash. Post,
Apr. 10, 1984, at 1, col. 3 (describing congressional leaders' reaction to CIA mining of
Nicaraguan ports); see also infra notes 63-65 (describing the reasons the Senate intelligence committee was not aware of the mining).
I See IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 3, at 25-150, 501-16. The administration's "secret" support for the anti-communist forces in Nicaragua was well known
long before the government dropped its pretense that the support was "covert." See,
e.g., America's Secret Warriors, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 10, 1983, at 38, 39 (describing U.S.
"covert" assistance to the Nicaragua rebels). This part of what former CIA General
Counsel Daniel Silver called "the spectacle of overt covert actions". See Silver, The Uses
and Misuses of Intelligence Oversight, 11 Hous. J. INT'L L. 7, 10 (1988). Another
example of this spectacle would be U.S. assistance to the Afghan resistance.
In 1983, upset over the administration's covert policies in Central America, the
House Intelligence Committee held hearings on a bill that would have required congressional authorization for "any clandestine paramilitary or military activity." See
CongressionalOversight of Covert Activities: Hearings Before the House Permanent
Select Comm. on Intelligence, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1983) (statement of Wyche
Fowler, Chairman, Subcomm. on Oversight and Evaluation). The first Boland Amendment, passed in FY 1983, prohibited the CIA, Pentagon, State Department, and any
other intelligence agency or its assets from furnishing military equipment, training,
advice, or other military support to paramilitary groups whose goal was to overthrow
the Sandinista regime, or to provoke a military exchange between Honduras and Nicaragua. See Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-377,
§ 793, 96 Stat. 1830, 1865 (1982). For a complete analysis of the various guises of the
Boland Amendment from FY 1983-87, see IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 3, at
395-407, 489-99.
6 For example, in 1974, the New York Times featured stories by Seymour Hersh
alleging CIA complicity in the overthrow of Chilean President Salvador Allende and
surveillance of anti-war protestors in the United States. See, e.g., Undergroundfor the
C.I.A. in New York- An Ex-Agent tells of Spying on Students, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29,
1974, at Al, col. 1 (alleging CIA surveillance of antiwar protestors); Helms Disavows
"Illegal" Spying by the CIA in U.S., N.Y. Times, Dec. 25, 1974, at Al, col. 8 (same);
Huge CIA Operation Reported in U.S. Against Antiwar Forces, Other Dissidents in
Nixon Years, N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1974, at Al, col. 8 (same); Kissinger Chile Briefings Said to Omit Mention of C.LA. Link to Labor Unrest, N.Y. Times, Sept. 21,
1974, at A12, col. 3 (alleging CIA involvement in Allende's demise); C.LA. Chief Tells
House of $8-Million Campaign Against Allende in '70-73, N.Y. Times, Sept. 8,
1974, at Al, col. 7 (same); see also Domestic Spying Denied: Helms Rejects Charges
Made Against CIA, Wash. Post, Dec. 25, 1974, at Al, cols. 6 & 8 (alleging CIA
surveillance of antiwar protestors). These reports were in fact only partially accurate,
but they nonetheless contributed to the impression of the CIA as a rogue agency. See
COMMISSION ON

CIA

ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE

U.S.,

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT

130-50 (1975) (stating that "Operation CHAOS," the domestic surveillance operation,
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eluded three administrations', three special congressional committees,8

and two blue-ribbon presidential panels.'
As a result, Congress's relationship with the Executive has been
marked with wariness in the area of intelligence.10 Policy differences
was carried out reluctantly by the CIA at the urging of the Johnson and Nixon administrations); T. POWERS, THE MAN WHO KEPT THE SECRETS: RICHARD HELMS &
THE CIA 220-31 (1979) (stating that the CIA became involved in Chile at Nixon's

insistence despite Director Helms' objections); B. WOODWARD,
WARS OF THE CIA 1981-1987 at 56 (1987) (same).

VEIL: THE SECRET

I President Ford was the first president to issue an executive order clarifying and
delimiting the intelligence community's scope of operations. See Exec. Order No.
11,905, 41 Fed. Reg. 7703 (1976) [hereinafter Ford Exec. Order 11,905]. Ford's order,
clearly a reaction to congressional and media criticisms of domestic intelligence activities, also contained the first written language prohibiting "political assassination." See
id. at 31, 41 Fed. Reg. at 7733.
Presidents Carter and Reagan also issued executive orders regarding' the intelligence community. President Carter's order focused on restrictions and oversight concerns. See Exec. Order No. 12,036, 43 Fed. Reg. 3674 (1978) [hereinafter Carter Exec.
Order 12,036]. President Reagan's order, however, took a different approach. While
mandating compliance with existing law, it demanded performance from the intelligence community, seeking to re-instill some 6lan to a bureaucracy still retreating from
public criticism. See Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1981) [hereinafter Reagan
Exec. Order 12,333]; J. OSETH, REGULATING U.S. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS: A
STUDY IN DEFINITION OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST 42-70 (1985)(surveying the public critique of intelligence operations); see also B. WOODWARD, supra note 6, at 55
(quoting a prominent Washington attorney as saying to DCI William Casey, "The
CIA is like a great dog that got hit by a truck. You can only say, 'He was a great dog
until he got hit by a truck.' ").
B In 1974, the Senate created the Church Committee to investigate allegations of
abuses committed by intelligence agencies. See S. Res. 21, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121
CONG. REC. 1416 (1975). The Church Committee, with a staff at one point reaching
130 professionals, consultants, and clerks, spent $3 million and over 15 months investigating the intelligence community. See Goldwater, Congress and Intelligence Oversight, WASH. Q., Summer 1983, at 16 ("I wish we could try to do to the Soviet KGB
what we tried to do to ourselves.").
The House created a parallel committee, known as the Pike Committee, which
was even more controversial than the Church Committee. Chairman Otis Pike's position that "[t]he bottom line is that Congress has the right to receive classified information without strings attached to it" led to numerous confrontations with both the House
leadership and the Executive. See L. JOHNSON, A SEASON OF INQUIRY: THE SENATE
INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION 78-79 (1985). A joint select committee to investigate
the Iran-Contra incident was created in 1987. See H.R. Res. 12, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987); S. Res. 23, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
9 See Exec. Order No. 11,828, 3 C.F.R. 933 (1975) (creating the Rockefeller
Commission to investigate the alleged domestic activities of the CIA); see also PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL REVIEW BOARD, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL REVIEW
BOARD at I1-13 (1987) [hereinafter TOWER COMMISSION] (investigating the National

Security Council and the circumstances and events of the Iran-Contra incident).
10 The debate over intelligence has its roots in the maelstrom of changing executive and legislative distributions of power in the aftermath of Vietnam and Watergate.
In addition to the substantive areas for disagreement between the branches, Congress
was in the midst of a structural revolution that posed great problems for relations with
executive branch intelligence organizations. See, e.g., D. PRICE, BRINGING BACK THE
PARTIES 56 (1984) (noting the general transition in Congress from a power broker
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between Congress and the Reagan Administration served to increase
this mistrust," and in the aftermath of the Iran-Contra incident, have
led to the introduction of numerous intelligence "reform" proposals."2
Our national commitment to intelligence oversight is unique; no
other nation has sought to balance the imperatives of national security
with democratic values in so public a fashion"8 and thereby risked losstatus of hierarchical congressional organization to a "bargaining" system in which authority was more diffuse); S. SMITH & C. DEERING, COMMITTEES IN CONGRESS 20-31
(1984) (describing the earlier structure of congressional organization and the impact of
the changing committee systems); J. SUNDQUIST, THE DECLINE AND RESURGENCE OF
CONGRESS 272-343 (1981) (noting that congressional attempts to regain control of foreign policy and its use of the oversight mechanism to enforce its will). This changing
environment had an obvious impact on the intelligence community. See generally L.
JOHNSON, supra note 8 (describing the congressional investigations of the intelligence
community in the mid-1970s and the difference in attitudes between the new authority
structure and the old power broker system).
11 See IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 3, at 19-20; see also B. WOODWARD,
supra note 6, at 322 (quoting Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Barry Goldwater's letter to DCI Director William Casey after the Nicaraguan mining:
"I am pissed off."). The tension characterizing congressional-executive relations in the
1980s led to disturbing trends in oversight. Frequent charges were made by Congress
that the intelligence on Central America was politicized and nonobjective, and in the
eyes of many observers, the attitudes of congressional oversight committees assumed an
increasingly partisan tone. See A.B.A.

STANDING COMM. ON LAW AND NAT'L SECURITY, OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES: AN
EVALUATION 21 (1985) [hereinafter ABA EVALUATION].
12 See, e.g., S.1852, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) ("Intelligence Activities Over-

sight Improvement Act"); S.1820, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) ("National Intelligence Reorganization Act of 1987"); S.1818, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) ("National
Security Reform Act of 1987"); S.1721, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) ("Intelligence
Oversight Act of 1987"); S.1458, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) ("GAO-CIA Audit Act
of 1987"); S.1235, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (amending National Security Act of
1947 to provide that Director of Central Intelligence will serve a seven-year term);
H.R. 3822, 100th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1987) ("Intelligence Oversight Act of 1987"); H.R.
1013, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) ("Intelligence Oversight Amendments of 1987");
see also infra note 119 and accompanying text (discussing congressional limits placed
on the ability of the Executive to initiate special activities without giving prior notice to
Congress).
1" See Goldwater, supra note 8, at 18 ("The U.S. intelligence system is the most
public intelligence system in the world"); see also J. RANELAGH, THE AGENCY: THE
RISE AND DECLINE OF THE CIA 16-17 (1987) ("[The CIA] is the most public of the

world's secret intelligence services, having its own press office-something no European
intelligence agency would dream of having."). Even Great Britain, the country whose
intelligence service served as the model for our own, takes a much more secretive approach to sensitive intelligence information. The Official Secrets Act of 1911 severely
restricts the distribution of classified information. See Official Secrets Act, 1911, 1 & 2
Geo. 5, ch. 28, §§ 1-13; Palmer, The History of the D-Notice Committee, in THE MISSING DIMENSION: GOVERNMENTS AND INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITIES IN THE TwENTI-

ETH CENTURY 227, 227-49 (C. Andrew & D. Dilks eds. 1984) [hereinafter MISSING

DIMENSION]. There is some evidence that Britain may move toward a more public
"American" approach. See Supperstone, The Law Relating To Security in Great Britain, in APPROACHES TO INTELLIGENCE, supra note 2, at 218-43 (describing the im-

pact of recent American judicial and legislative approaches on British perspectives);
Raines, Britain'sSecrets Face New Battle, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1987, at All, col. 1.
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ing secrets to adversaries.14 When evaluating intelligence oversight legislation or proposals, the paramount question is: What kind of oversight is possible, and how shall it be implemented and enforced?
Malfunction in, and dissatisfaction with, the oversight mechanism
is inevitable when broad policy disputes between the executive and legislative branches are waged within the narrow confines of intelligence
oversight.' 5 Reform proposals cannot succeed without providing for a
means of resolution outside those narrow confines. 6 Since the more formal intelligence oversight process began in the mid-1970s, however,
such a resolution has become increasingly difficult. Seeking to maximize their institutional interests, both branches have increasingly re7
sorted to legalistic approaches to intelligence oversight.1
But as of today, America is unique in its willing exposure of its intelligence service to
the public.
14 History has demonstrated the risks inherent to the mechanism for congressional
oversight of intelligence activities. For example, in 1975, the Pike Committee ignored
objections by the Executive and unilaterally decided to declassify transcripts that revealed the National Security Agency's capability of monitoring Egyptian communications during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. See L. JOHNSON, supra note 8, at 78-79; see
also C. CRABB & P. HOLT, INVITATION TO STRUGGLE: CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT
AND FOREIGN POLICY 150-52 (1980) (describing Pike Committee and the role of Rep.
Harrington, who admitted leaking confidential information relating to CIA activities in
Chile but was unrepentant).
Other incidents of congressional leaks of intelligence information include the inadvertent listing of a secret organization in a Senate Report. The result was a full scale
exposE of the secret organization. See S. REP. No. 466, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973);
Caldwell, Button the Loose Lips in Congress, San Diego Union, July 26, 1987, at 1.
In a more recent incident, Rep. Zablocki reportedly leaked the details of a plan to
topple Libyan leader Muammar Quaddafi. See B. WOODWARD, supra note 6, at 15860; see also infra note 163 and accompanying text.
On the whole, Congress' record is neither as good as it might wish nor as bad as
its detractors often suggest, but the risk is real.
15 See A.B.A. EVALUATION, supra note 11, at 21-23 (describing controversy surrounding covert action funding as struggle between the executive and legislative

branches); see also Karalekas, Intelligence Oversight: Has Anything Changed?, 6
Q., Summer 1983, at 22, 30 (noting that changing and undefined congressional
policy priorities have placed the intelligence committees into a position of uncertainty as
the focus point for inter-branch conflict).
16 Cf Karalekas, supra note 15, at 30 ("[T]he expectations for reform that
emerged from the period of congressional investigations were disproportionately fixed
on statutory and procedural remedies for issues that remain difficult both to define and
to reach agreement on in those terms.").
17 See supra note 5 & infra notes 44-47, 83-84 and accompanying text (describing
the Hughes-Ryan, Clark, and Boland Amendments). This trend toward legalization is
not restricted to legislation. For example, Michael Malbin has noted that the congressional investigation of the Iran-Contra episode was conducted in an almost entirely
"legalesque" mode, with criminal lawyers and the majority "making obedience to the
law [their] central theme." See M. Malbin, Legalism Versus Political Checks and Balances: Legislative-Executive Relations in the Wake of Iran-Contra 15 (April 9, 1988)
(draft of paper presented at the American Enterprise Institute conference on "The EmWASH.

battled Executive"); see also Koh, Why the Executive (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign
Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1275 (1988) ("By
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Recourse to these formalistic "legal" oversight approaches will not
serve to create a stable basis for guidance of intelligence activities. For
legalesque approaches-either in budgetary or in statutory
terms-inherently are preoccupied "with preventing the occurrence...
of objectionable actions and ignoring the problems of inducing desired
behavior patterns.""8 Furthermore, the policy implications for
"legalesque" oversight techniques are vast, for by their unavoidable retroactive nature, they potentially threaten the operational stability of
U.S. intelligence entities. The United States urgently needs a stable intelligence regime, for as the world becomes increasingly less malleable
to the overt use of U.S. force or influence, the need for an effective and
accountable intelligence capability will increase. 9
adopting a quasi-judicial tone for their report, the Iran-Contra Committees compounded their failure to recognize historical patterns . . .Congress played both judge
and prosecutor."). Furthermore, the Executive also resorted to legal means to support
policy preferences. While Congress has significant restrictions on the sale of weapons
abroad, such as the International Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94329, 90 Stat. 729 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2318 (1982 & Supp. IV 1985)),
the Executive argued that ambiguities about how this law interacted with covert action
supported the Executive's position in the Iran-Contra scandal. See, e.g., IRAN-CONTRA
REPORT,supra note 3, at 541. In addition, the Executive sought a legal opinion from a
very young lawyer very low in the Executive's legal hierarchy to support its contention
that the National Security Council was not within the scope of the Boland Amendments' restrictions on aid to the rebel forces in Nicaragua-despite the obvious political
ramifications of using such a technical loophole. See id. at 400.
The use of the law has been an attempt by all parties not to shape policy but to
determine outcomes-in intelligence activities, however, the law can only be used thus
retroactively. For a critique of this approach, see Hastedt, Controlling Intelligence:
The Role of the DCI, INT'L J. INTELLIGENCE & COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, Winter
1986, at 25, 25-27.
18 Hastedt, supra note 17, at 26; see also Koh, supra note 17, at 1274 (noting
that "[in a familiar regulatory pattern, Congress' successive efforts to catch-up with
Executive evasion of its legislative controls served only to shift Executive activity");
Toensing, Congressional Oversight: Impeding the Executive Branch and Abusing the
Individual, 11 Hous. J. INT'L L. 169, 173 (1988) (noting that Congress passes oversight laws or restrictions such as the Boland Amendment "where the language is not
crafted with the specific culpable intent required in criminal laws, and where the language also contains the murkiness and obfuscation permitting a broader political spectrum to vote for them").
19 This statement is, of course, a value-laden prediction. Overextension and weakening of U.S. power, however, and its debilitating effects on national security has been
widely noted for some time. A representative work of this genre is P. KENNEDY,THE
RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS: ECONOMIC CHANGE AND MILITARY CONFLICT FROM 1500 TO 2000 (1987) (noting the historical cycle of expansion, economic

weakening, and eventual contraction of powerful nations). See also Schlesinger, "We
Sometimes Forget... How Powerful this Nation Is," N.Y. Times, June 19, 1988, § 6
(Magazine), at 35, 35 (noting widespread predictions of U.S. overextension and decline
among decisionmaking elites).
The need for good, accurate, and effective intelligence will become even more critical as our resources become more constrained. Yet, the U.S. is not configured for this
eventuality. Conventional military power will not arguably address the greatest threat
to future U.S. security: the spectrum of conflict known as "low intensity conflict," and
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The entire debate between the executive and legislative branches
on intelligence questions centers on the constitutional allocation of
power between the branches. This Comment argues that there is no
clear constitutional delineation of responsibility for intelligence activities, but that application of the proper separation of powers analysis
requires a balancing of branch interests2" that leaves the executive more
latitude than is contained in many of the post-Iran-Contra legislative
proposals.2' The balancing test presented below is based on a functional approach to intelligence activities, disaggregating broad terms
such as "special activity" into discrete categories based on the nature of
the activity in question. While Congress's oversight interests and rights
are strongest in the area of paramilitary activity, provisions requiring
that Congress be given prior notice of such activities or instituting a
statutorily defined definition of "timeliness" of such notice are too
broad and thus unconstitutional. This analysis reveals a more limited
legal basis for congressional oversight than some in Congress
articulate. 22
"amorphous wars." See T. Franck, Improving the Performance of Congress in Foreign
Policy 2 (March 30, 1988) (paper presented to the ABA Standing Committee on Law
and National Security) (on file at the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) (noting
that our enemies "train, arm and finance terrorist groups and insurgencies which nibble at the periphery of our sphere of interest and bore at our national security in ambiguous, but efficient fashion"). This type of conflict poses indirect threats and demands a subtle application of countervailing power. And "[t]he intelligence-policy
connection is especially strained in situations characterized by ambiguous threats to
U.S. security, [and] by substantial disagreement among [U.S.] policy elites about how to
respond." Cimbala, Amorphous Wars, 2 INT'L J. INTELLIGENCE & COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 73, 73 (1988). Yet these "amorphous wars" will continue to grow in number,
importance, and scope, requiring effective and flexible intelligence capabilities. See generally J. ADAMS, SECRET ARMIES: INSIDE THE AMERICAN, SOVIET AND EUROPEAN
SPECIAL FORCES 390-98 (1987) (noting the disorganization of Western approaches to
low intensity conflict).
'20 Thus, along the traditional spectrum of functional versus formalist constitutional analysis, this Comment employs a functional approach. For an explanation of
why such a test is appropriate for the subject see infra notes 110-26 and accompanying
text. While this Comment stresses the complex interaction between the branches and
employs a test based on juridical standards to delineate the boundaries of permissable
oversight, it does not seek to refute Dean Jesse Choper's notion that the system ultimately is self-correcting and best left alone from judicial interference. See J. CHOPER,
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 273-275 (1980). The
functional balancing test provides the contours within which a purely political interbranch compromise can be negotiated and ratified through practice. See infra notes
158-82 and accompanying text.
21 See, e.g., S.1721, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) ("Intelligence Oversight Act of
1988"); H.R. 1371, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) ("Covert Action Notification Act of
1987); H.R. 1013, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) ("Intelligence Oversight Amendments
of 1987").
22 This Comment implicitly rejects the notion that Congress has a right to oversee
all intelligence activities and hence a right to all intelligence information. Many scholars and congressional partisans, however, believe that Congress does have a right to
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Given the legal parameters established above, this Comment advocates abandoning recourse to statutory law to enforce policy preferences
in favor of a mechanism that is instead based on the recognition that
stable and effective oversight must entail compromise, flexibility, and
genuine political dialogue between the Executive and Congress in order
to serve the needs of both branches and the Nation.
Part One defines the term "intelligence" as it is used in this Comment, and will briefly describe the composition of the intelligence community. Part Two explores the relationship between constitutional provisions for intelligence activities and congressional and executive power
over the conduct of foreign affairs. This Part also assesses the constitutionality of congressional attempts to restrict or interfere with executive
discretion in intelligence activities, particularly as they relate to the
congressional requirement of prior or "timely" notice of covert activities. Part Three focuses on the need to create a more stable relationship
between Congress and the Executive than that provided by the legal
formalism produced by arguing constitutional extremes.
The Comment concludes by proposing a departure from the current trend of legally rigid and ossified statutory oversight mechanisms
to one featuring political compromise and flexibility, supplemented by
modest structural changes in both legislative and executive oversight institutions, and by statutory changes in the Intelligence Oversight Act of
1980. The goal of this proposal is to maximize efficiency and
accountability.

limitless oversight of intelligence activities. See H.R. 1013, H.R. 1371, and Other
Proposals Which Address the Issue of Affording Prior Notice of Covert Actions to the
Congress: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Legislation of the House PermanentSelect Comm. on Intelligence, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 137 (1987) [hereinafter Covert
Hearings] (statement of William G. Miller, former Staff Director of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence) (noting that "all intelligence information should be available to the Congress without exception"); C. CRABB & P. HOLT, supra note 14, at 137
("In its fundamentals, the relationship of Congress to the intelligence community is, or
should be, no different from its relationship to other parts of the executive branch.");
see also L. Fisher, Understanding the Role of Congress in Foreign Policy 13 (March
30, 1988) (paper presented to ABA Standing Committee on Law and National Security) (on file with the University of PennsylvaniaLaw Review) ("Congress has extensive
powers in foreign affairs, including not only the powers specifically enumerated in the
Constitution but also those implied in the effective functioning of government."). By
this, presumably, Fisher sees no effective limit on the scope of congressional intelligence
oversight authority.
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I. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND CONGRESSIONAL
OVERSIGHT

A. Intelligence and the Intelligence Community
Intelligence is "information or knowledge; as operational activity
designed to acquire, exploit, or protect knowledge; and as organization
developed for those purposes."2 3 Intelligence is more than information;
it is the product of processed information.2 4 Accordingly, this Comment
focuses on the generation of a specific product (or activity) and the interaction of that process with decisionmaking elites.
As traditionally understood, there are three types, or genres, of
intelligence activities: collection, counterintelligence, and special activities. Special activities are frequently referred to as covert action.25 Intelligence "collection" is the acquisition of any information that might be
required by end-use consumers, such as analysts, policymakers, or
agents. Intelligence is collected through the use of human sources
("HUMINT"), photo/image technologies ("PHOTOINT") and signals sources ("SIGINT").2"
Counterintelligence is the process of neutralizing foreign hostile
intelligence services through acquiring information or pursuing other
activities. This discipline has subgenres, such as the debriefing of defectors, entrapment of foreign personnel, direct penetration of hostile ser27
vices, or disruption of individual operations.
Special activities are operations designed to influence foreign governments, people, or events surreptitiously, in ways that benefit the
Godson, supra note 2, at 4 (quoting the eminence grise of American strategic
analysts, Sherman Kent (emphasis omitted)). A more common perception is of intelligence as merely information. See, e.g., J. OsETH, supra note 7, at 12 (Intelligence is
"evaluated information compiled to apprise and instruct national decisionmakers about
situations requiring or likely to require their attention.").
" For the classic study of how cognitive dissonance-that is, failure to process
23

information properly-led to an intelligence failure, see R. WOHLSTETTER, PEARL
HARBOR: WARNING AND DECISION 382-401 (1962) (knowledge of Japanese intent to

attack Pearl Harbor was available, but analysis and distribution systems failed to transform this information into intelligence available to American decisionmakers).
25 Some purists object to including covert action in the definition of intelligence,
but it is clear that the CIA considers covert action to be an intelligence function. See
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, U.S. INTELLIGENCE DURING THE WAR FOR INDEPENDENCE 16-19 (1976). Many informed observers also share this view. See, e.g., God-

son, supra note 2, at 25-27 (placing a discussion of covert action within the context of
an overview of the American intelligence process).
28 See, e.g., J. BAMFORD, THE PUZZLE PALACE 377-78 (1982) (describing the
differences between the three techniques).
2 See Zuehlke, What is Counterintelligence?, in INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE 1980's: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 13, 29-30 (R. Godson ed. 1980) (describing
basic forms and features of aggressive counterintelligence).
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sponsor."8 While commonly confused in the public mind with purely
paramilitary activity, special activities include paramilitary operations,
but also political actions directed toward destabilization, exfiltration
and infiltration activities, support for causes and individuals such as
newspapers, insurgents, labor unions or political parties, and
disinformation. 9
The Central Intelligence Agency is only one of a handful of intelligence organizations, some of which dwarf the CIA in terms of manpower, budgetary resources, and capabilities. 30 The most obvious players in the intelligence community include the CIA, the State
Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research ("INR"),3 ' the Na28 Special activities is a catchall phrase embodying a wide variety of activities.
CIA legend Richard Bissel stated covert action included: political advice and counsel;
subsidies to an individual; financial support and "technical assistance" to political parties; support of private organizations including labor unions, business firms, cooperatives, and the like; covert propaganda; "private" training of individuals in and exchanges with friendly intelligence services; economic operations; and paramilitary or
political action operations designed to overthrow or support a regime. See J. OsErH,
supra note 7, at 27-28; see also Reagan Exec. Order No. 12,333, supra note 7, at 215
(defining special activities as "activities conducted in support of national foreign policy
objectives abroad which are planned and executed so that the role of the United States
Government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly. .. ").
The U.S. Senate recently sought to define special activities using text from the
Hughes-Ryan Amendment and President Reagan's executive order. See S. REP. No.
276, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1988) (noting that the term "special activity" for purposes of the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1988 was intended to incorporate the "mutually agreed upon" definitions of both documents).
29 See J. RICHELSON, THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 3 (1985) (defining
various tasks for covert action). Paramilitary activities involve the "active direction, deployment, or support of regular or irregular armed bodies of men employing unconventional military means to achieve their (or their sponsor's) political objectives." See
Charters, The Role of Intelligence Services in the Direction of Covert Paramilitary
Operations, in POLICY AND PROCESS, supra note 1, at 334. Although the CIA is currently comprised of both analytical and operational functions, it was not originally created as such. Some argue that the CIA's covert paramilitary function should be separated from the rest of the agency. See id. at 339 (noting the success of the British use of
the SAS in the 1970's to quell the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman); Lockhart, supra note 2,
at 37-38 (arguing that paramilitary operations are most effectively conducted by the
military, citing the Bay of Pigs fiasco and the French SDECE failure in Algeria as
examples).
SO While the public generally credits the CIA as the most powerful or secretive of
the intelligence agencies, it is neither. The CIA actually accounts for a mere 15 percent
of the intelligence community in terms of manpower, and less in terms of budgetary
control. The majority of assets and control actually resides in the hands of the Secretary
of Defense, whose department controls about 80 percent of the money allocated to intelligence. See J. RANELAGH, supra note 13, at 548-549; J. RiCHELSON, supra note 29,
at 279. According to former DCI Richard Helms, "when the 'DCI clashes with the
secretary of defense, he isn't a big enough fellow on the block.'" Hastedt, supra note
17, at 35.
S INR is comprised of the remnants of the old research and analysis wing of the
now-defunct Office of Strategic Services ("OSS"), which were transferred to the State
Department after World War II. The remainder of OSS, mainly its clandestine activi-
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tional Security Agency ("NSA"),3 2 the Defense Department's Defense
Intelligence Agency ("DIA"), and photo-intelligence organizations in
the Pentagon that jointly supervise the nation's space-based assets with
the Director of Central Intelligence."3 The armed services each have an
intelligence section. On domestic issues and foreign counterintelligence,
the FBI has significant resources and preeminence. 4 Even other departments often not associated in the public mind with intelligence have
peripheral intelligence functions. 35 Of these organizations, only the
CIA, NSA, and the photo-intelligence resources in the Pentagon are
national intelligence organizations; they perform intelligence for the entire government, not any single department. Any oversight mechanism
has to be broad and flexible enough to encompass the entirety of the
intelligence community and the realities of the fragmented power
within it.3"
ties and administrative staff, was transferred to the War Department. See B. SMITH,
THE SHADOW WARRIORS 406 (1983).
2 The National Security Agency is the largest member of the intelligence community, and one of the most secretive. The NSA was created by the Executive Branch by
executive order; upon its inception, no mention of the NSA was made in the Govern-

ment OrganizationManual, the Federal Register, or the CongressionalRecord. The

order creating the NSA was classified top secret with a code word that was itself classified. See SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENT.OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, SUPPLEMENTARY DETAILED STAFF REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, BOOK III, S.
REP. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 736 (1976); J. BAMFORD, supra note 26, at 1-2.

While the collective reconnaissance budget in the Pentagon is the largest item in the
intelligence budget, the Director of the NSA oversees the largest single unified program
as Chief of the Central Security Service. See J. RICHELSON, supra note 29, at 19-20.
" These assets are supervised by a national level organization within the Air
Force while the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the Secretary of Defense
have final control of asset deployment. The name of this organization is still officially
"black," or secret.
3' See Reagan Exec. Order No. 12,333, supra note 7, at 210; see also M. LowENTHAL, U.S. INTELLIGENCE: EVOLUTION AND ANATOMY 98 (1984) (describing the
F.B.I. as the "paramount agency" in the counterintelligence field); S. UNGAR, FBI: AN
UNCENSORED LOOK BEHIND THE WALLS 109-18 (1976) (describing the Bureau's organization and counterintelligence effort against the Soviet GRU and KGB); Elliff, The
Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI Investigations, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 785
(1984) (noting changes in FBI guidelines during the Reagan Administration that have
increased the Bureau's latitude in domestic security matters).
" The the Office of Intelligence Support of the Department of Energy, the Department of Agriculture's Foreign Agriculture Service, the Drug Enforcement Agency,
and even the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress all have intelligence-related missions. See J. RICHELSON, supra note 29, at 95-104.
There is no statutory definition of the intelligence community, but President Reagan's executive order defines the intelligence community as the CIA, the NSA, the
DIA, the photo-intelligence and reconnaissance offices in the Pentagon, INR, the staff
elements of the Director of Central Intelligence, and the intelligence elements of the
armed forces, the F.B.I., the Department of the Treasury, and the Department of Energy. See Reagan Exec. Order 12,333, supra note 7, at 215.
8' This assumes, of course, that the reform does not grant the DCI the actual
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CongressionalOversight of Intelligence Activities

Study of intelligence oversight practice is useful to establish the
contours of cooperation possible in the era following the Iran-Contra
incident. The oversight odyssey has traveled through all three phases of
Justice Jackson's famous quasi-algebraic formula describing the interrelationship of executive and congressional powers in Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 7 Congress has historically vacillated between
benign neglect of its oversight power and zealous overreaching. The
current reform impulse demonstrates renewed congressional desire to
increase its oversight role by means of a legalistic approach. Understanding how this state of affairs came into existence may reveal a path
to a more stable relationship between the Executive and Congress in
the area of intelligence oversight.
Prior to the 1970s, Congress rarely interfered with the President's
use of intelligence resources and was reluctant to take an active oversight role. For example, Senator Ellender, while serving as Chairman
of the Senate Appropriations Intelligence Operations Subcommittee, reportedly said that he did not want to learn details of the CIA budget
for fear that he might talk in his sleep. 8
power and authority in the intelligence community to control its resources and be held
accountable for performance of the entire intelligence effort. As originally conceived,
the CIA "was to establish an organization that would coordinate the intelligence activities of the various other U.S. intelligence components and take the results of this work
. . . to produce a common estimate." J. RICHELSON, supra note 29, at 338. The central coordinating role was abdicated by Allen Dulles, who remained fascinated by covert action and clandestine collection. The fissures in the intelligence community today
are due in part to his dislike of the DCI's community management role. See, e.g., id. at
338-342 (describing how even Eisenhower despaired of ever getting Dulles to perform
community management functions). Given the entrenched political and bureaucratic interests in the current diaphonous arrangement, the current diffusion of power in the
intelligence community is unlikely to change absent a sufficiently strong galvanizing
situation such as a national calamity.
37 343 U.S. 579 (1952). There, Justice Jackson said that when "the President
acts
pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its
maximum," and when the President acts without such an authorization, "he can only
rely upon his own independent powers," but when the President acts against the express or implied will of Congress, "his power is at its lowest ebb." Id. at 635, 637

(Jackson, J., concurring).

8 See Nomination of William E. Colby: Hearingson the Nomination of William
E. Colby to the Director of Central Intelligence Before the Senate Comm. on Armed
Services, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1973) (remarks of Senator Hughes); 120 CONG. REC.
17,492 (1974) (same);.
Past efforts by some senators to secure greater oversight of intelligence matters
were not greeted with strong support. For instance, Senator Mansfield received only 27
votes in support of his oversight bill introduced in 1955. Mansfield's proposal was to
create a joint intelligence committee modeled after the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, created in 1946. See C. CRABB & P. HOLT, supra note 14, at 141. After the Bay
of Pigs fiasco, Senator Eugene McCarthy attempted and failed to secure support for
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From the 1950s to the early 1970s, Congress preferred an informal oversight mechanism,3 9 in part, because of the perceived low political payoff of intelligence oversight. 0 In the midst of hearings investigating the CIA's involvement in Chile, Senator Hubert Humphrey
declared: "I have to go now. I am trying to get jobs for 400 people in
Minnesota today. That is a great deal more important to me right now
than Chile."41 This attitude led to an atmosphere in which accountability was the exception, and leniency the rule.4 2 This atmosphere underintelligence oversight. See J. RANELAGH, supra note 13, at 479. After the Dominican
intervention in 1965, McCarthy tried and failed again, this time by a vote of 61-28. See
C. CRABB & P. HOLT, supra note 14, at 479.
" From the time of the CIA's establishment in 1947, its funding was "concealed
in appropriations for other agencies, mainly the Defense Department." C. CRABB & P.
HOLT, supra note 14, at 140; see also CIA: Congressin Dark About Activities, Spending, 29 CONG. Q. 1840, 1840 (1971) (noting the failure of some 200 bills, over a
twenty year period, aimed at making the CIA "more accountable."). While four subcommittees of the House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees
were theoretically in an oversight function, the subcommittees convened infrequently
and "sometimes went a whole year without meeting." C. CRABB & P. HOLT, supra
note 14, at 140; see also L. JOHNSON, supra note 8, at 7 (also noting the infrequency
with which these subcommittees met).
According to former Secretary of State Dean Rusk, the President and two or three
people in the Bureau of the Budget were the only people outside the CIA who saw the
CIA budget before it was turned over to Senator Russell, Chairman of the Senate
Armed Services Committee, who would then bury it in the defense budget without
hearings, questions, or complaints. His judgment was the final word. See id. at 6-7; T.
POwERS, supra note 6, at 276 (detailing the immense power wielded by Senator Russell); see also C. CRABB & P. HOLT, supra note 14, at 140 (noting that the NSA's
"existence was scarcely acknowledged for years").
40 See Karalekas, supra note 15, at 27 (noting that "[w]hile the period of the
investigations [provides] high visibility and assured headlines, ongoing oversight is
shrouded in secrecy without a public constituency").
41 CIA Foreign and Domestic Activities: Hearings on Activities of the Central
Intelligence Agency in Foreign Countries and in the United States Before the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1975).
4' For example, CIA-sponsored reconnaissance planes such as the U-2 and SR-71
were never subjected to the criticism and scrutiny reserved for Strategic Air Command
programs such as the B-52 or B-70 program. See J. RANELAGH, supra note 13, at 481;
see also C. CRABB & P. HOLT, supra note 14, at 137 (noting that "[t]he intelligence
community had been conditioned by more than a quarter century of experience not to
tell Congress what it was doing. And Congress has been conditioned not to ask").
Even CIA paramilitary activities were usually given only cursory attention, if any.
When it became public that the agency was secretly supporting a 36,000-man Laotian
army during the Indochina conflict, Senator Fulbright asked Senator Ellender if the
CIA had come before the oversight committee for approval. Ellender responded, "Probably," adding, "[but] I did not know anything about it." 117 CONG. REc. 42,929
(1971) (Ellender was Chairman of the Appropriations Intelligence Oversight SubCommittee); see also L. JOHNSON, supra note 8, at 5-6 (describing the story of how
during a congressional briefing on CIA paramilitary activity, a bored, inattentive, and
occasionally slumbering congressman thought the briefing was on parliamentary
activity).
Of the entire intelligence community, the NSA has traditionally enjoyed the most
protection, with Senator Russell once reportedly asking during a briefing, "What does
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went a radical change in the mid-1970s.
1. Congressional Oversight in the 1970s
The mid-1970s saw significant changes in Congress's role in intelligence oversight. After revelations about the CIA's role in the 1973
destabilization of the Chilean economy of Salvador Allende,4" Congress
passed the Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the 1961 Foreign Assistance
Act.," With the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, Congress passed the first
statutory provision regulating foreign intelligence activities, particularly
special activities. The Act prohibited expenditure of funds for covert
actions unless the President made a personal "finding" that the action
was necessary and reported the finding to "the appropriate committees
of the Congress, 45 numbering six at the time,4" in a "timely fashion. 1 The Act did not require committee approval, but many felt the
number of committees and the corresponding risk of leaks would force
the Executive to minimize the number of politically sensitive covert
activities.48
After the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, Congress established a more
formal committee structure to oversee U.S. intelligence activities. In
1976, the Senate established the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.49 A year later, the House created the House Permanent Select
"7

the NSA do?" See T.

POWERS, supra note 6, at 276.
& P. HOLT, supra note 14, at 145-46 (describing congressional
inquiry into the CIA's role in Allende's downfall); see also J. RANELAGH, supra note
13, at 610 (interpreting the Hughes-Ryan Amendment as a reaction to CIA attempts to
prevent Allende's election).
44 Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-559, § 32, 88 Stat. 1795,
1804-05 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2422 (1982)).
45 See id.
46 See C. CRABB & P. HOLT, supra note 14, at 147.
47 Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-559, § 32, 88 Stat. 1795, 1804
(codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2422 (1982)).
41 See, e.g., ABA EVALUATION, supra note 11, at 10. Initially, the Hughes-Ryan
Amendment did not pose a problem for the Carter administration, since the Carter
regime was less inclined to consider covert action a useful tool. Only after the Iranian
and Afghan debacles did the Carter administration belatedly seek to rebuild the covert
action arm of the CIA devastated by DCI Stansfield Turner. See J. RANELAGH, supra
note 13, at 644-648, 652 ("The effective closedown of the clandestine service was another indication of U.S. withdrawal. The whole history of America in the world is one
of intervention followed by departure, and Turner was ensuring that the CIA mirrored
this."); id. at 645 n.*; see also Karalekas, supra note 15, at 28 (discussing the heightened interest by the Carter Administration in covert action in response to the hostage
taking in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan).
49 See S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REc. 14,673, 14,673-75
(1976). The significance of budgetary oversight was underscored in section 12 of the
resolution, which provided that after September 30, 1976-the start of the fiscal year
1977 budget-no funds would be appropriated for the CIA, NSA, DIA, the FBI's
43

See C.

CRABB
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Committee on Intelligence, with similar authority.50 Both the House
and Senate resolutions limited membership to a fixed time period to
prevent either committee from becoming too close to the community it
was intended to oversee. 5 The addition of these two oversight committees raised the number of committees to which the Executive had to
report under the Hughes-Ryan Amendment to eight. 2
Congress strengthened its oversight power once again through the
Intelligence and Intelligence-Related Activities Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1979." 3 That Act placed intelligence agencies on the same
annual authorization and appropriation basis as other executive branch
agencies. 4 In doing so, Congress used its power of the purse to reinforce its oversight powers, not just for covert activities, but for the entire range of intelligence activities.
Congress's efforts to strengthen its oversight of intelligence activities went beyond the creation of new committees and budgetary procedures. Congress included a charge to draft a charter for the intelligence
community in the hope of providing a comprehensive basis for both
executive and congressional oversight of intelligence activities. 55 The
task of drafting such a charter proved to be problematic,56 and the proIntelligence Division, and other Defense Department intelligence activities unless such
funds were authorized by a bill or joint resolution passed by the Senate. See id. § 12,

122 CONG. REC. at 14,675.
50 See H.R. Res. 658, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. 22,932-34 (1977).
As was the case with S. Res. 400, H.R. Res. 658 provided for budgetary control. Compare S. Res. 400, § 3(a)(4), 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REc. 14,673, 14,673
(1976) (requiring that authorizations for appropriations be submitted to the Senate
Intelligence Committee) with H.R. Res. 658, § 2(a)(4), 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123
CONG. REC. 22,932, 22,932-33 (1977) (requiring that authorizations for appropriations
be submitted to the House Intelligence Committee).
H.R. Res. 658, unlike S. Res. 400, permitted the House committee to oversee
tactical military intelligence in addition to the activities of the intelligence agencies.
This permitted the House Committee the authority to oversee intelligence related activities ("IRA") funding in DoD. See 123 CONG. REC. 22,941-42 (1977) (summary of
significant differences between S. Res. 400 and H.R. Res. 658). Compare H.R. Res.
658, § 2(10)(a), 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 22,934 (1977) ("[I]ntelligence
and intelligence related activities" does not exclude tactical foreign military intelligence.) with S. Res. 400, § 14(a), 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REc. 14,675 (1976)
("[I]ntelligence and intelligence related activities" excludes "tactical foreign military intelligence serving no national policymaking function.").
",See ABA EVALUATION, supra note 11, at 8.
52 See C. CRABB & P. HOLT, supra note 14, at 146-47.
"' Pub. L. No. 95-370, 92 Stat. 626 (1978).

5'See ABA EVALUATION, supra note 11, at 8.
M See H.R. Res. 658, § 3(a)(2), 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 22,932,
22,934 (1977); S.Res. 400, § 13(a)(2), 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. 14,673,
14,675 (1976).
" In the words of a former congressional staffer on the Church Committee, "The
qualitative aspects of intelligence analysis, the intricacies of clandestine collection, and
problems of cover, among others, simply did not find ready solution in the' fixed lan-
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posal that eventually emerged 57 met with heavy opposition from the
Carter administration.58 Congress's charter proposal ultimately yielded
a compromise; negotiations between the Executive and the intelligence
committees produced the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980.5'
2.

The 1980 Oversight Act

The Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980 requires the Executive to
keep Congress "fully and currently informed" of all intelligence activities, but reduces the number of intelligence oversight committees from
eight to two.6 ° While the Act generally requires prior notice of special
activities, 1 it permits the President-under special circumstances-to
62
act first and notify Congress after the fact.
The 1980 Act was considered to be an acceptable framework for
intelligence oversight, and through the 1980s, it proved fairly effective.
A controversial exception to the provision of prior notice was the CIA's
1984 mining operation in Nicaraguan waters. 63 The resulting uproar
led to a negotiated settlement in 1984 (with an addendum in 1986)
between Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) William Casey and the
Senate Intelligence Committee. 4
This agreement formalized "the requirement that the Director report any significant anticipated intelligence activity, including instances
in which the activity would be part of an ongoing program. '65 The
only major deviation from the pattern of executive compliance since this
agreement was the Iran-Contra incident, which has generated the largguage of the law." Karalekas, supra note 15, at 25.
57 See S.2525, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) ("National Intelligence Reorganization and Reform Act of 1978").
" See J. OSETH, supra note 7, at 139.
59 50 U.S.C. § 413 (1982); see ABA EVALUATION, supra note 11, at 11-12; J.
OSETH, supra note 7, at 142.
6 50 U.S.C. § 413(a)(1) (1982); see ABA EVALUATION, supra note 11, at 12.
61 See 50 U.S.C. § 413(a)(1) (1982).
63 See id. § 413(b).
63 Both the Senate and the House committees were informed of the mining operation but, unlike the House committee, the Senate committee had not pulled the facts of
several briefings together. See Covert Hearings, supra note 22, at 246. But see S. REP.
No. 276, supra note 28, at 16-17 (Senate committee's account of the incident).
" This settlement was known as the "Casey Accords." For a copy of the signed
documents, see Covert Hearings, supra note 22, at 35-43.
66 IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 3, at 378. The House Committee did not
demand a similar commitment from Casey, because unlike their Senate counterparts,
they knew about the operation. This incident reflects the chaotic nature of the Senate
staffing situation. See Covert Hearings, supra note 22, at 246; ABA EVALUATION,
supra note 11, at 9. Thus, while exhibiting extremely insensitive political judgment,
the CIA did not actively mislead the Senate; the committee simply did not pick up
oblique references to the program in testimony.
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est furor over intelligence oversight since the Church Committee's
heyday.
As a result of the Iran-Contra hearings, legislation was introduced
seeking to cure a number of putative "problems" with intelligence oversight. 6 Examples of some "solutions" were the creation of a new office,
the National Intelligence Director," and a congressionally confirmed
Inspector General of the CIA.68 The two proposals that generated the
most support eliminated the soft definition of "timely notice" in the
1980 Act, substituting a rigid requirement of 48 hours notice.6 9
In sum, Congress has moved from the extreme of voluntary deference to the opposite extreme of intrusion into the Executive's discretion
to conduct intelligence operations. The 1980 Act demonstrated that
compromise is a viable possibility in oversight. The Iran-Contra incident, however, has prompted a swing back to the approach of the mid1970s and a more aggressive, legalesque, and intrusive form of congressional oversight. These latest proposals are not only of questionable
constitutional validity; if they are adopted, they will result in an impractical and unnecessarily confrontational approach to intelligence
oversight.
II.

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT AND COMPETING CLAIMS TO
CONSTITUTIONAL POWER

The nature of intelligence oversight disputes between Congress
and the Executive is that of competing claims to constitutional power.
The Constitution does not overtly confer authority for intelligence activities to either the Congress or the President; intelligence is a derivative function of each branch's respective powers over foreign affairs."0
66 See supra note 12 (listing oversight reform legislation).
67 See S. 1820, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) ("National Intelligence Reorganization Act of 1987"); S. 1818, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) ("National Security Reform
Act of 1987") (both written by Sen. Specter).
66 See S. 1458, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) ("General Accounting Office-Central

Intelligence Agency Audit Act of 1987") (written by Sen. Glenn).
69 See S. 1721,

100th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 503(a)(1) (1987); H.R. 3822, 100th

Cong., 1st Sess. § 503(a)(1) (1987).
70

See

L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONsTrTrrioN 16, 44 (1972)

(power to conduct foreign affairs is undefined by the Constitution); see also Covert
Hearings, supra note 22, at 219 (letter by Louis Henkin) (intelligence activities are
linked to the derivative foreign affairs powers of each branch); id. at 247-73 (statement
of Assistant Attorney General Charles Cooper) (intelligence is directly related to the
Executive's constitutional authority to conduct foreign policy); Vance, Striking the Balance: Congress and the President Under the War Powers Resolution, 133 U. PA. L.
REv. 79, 83 (1984) ("[M]any important foreign affairs powers and war powers are not
expressly allocated, and even the extent of those that are allocated is unclear.").
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On the one hand, Congress's broad power71 to legislate, appropriate
funds, regulate commerce, and declare war, support its claim of extensive authority to oversee intelligence activities. Conversely, the claims of
presidential plenary power to conduct foreign affairs supports the claim
for unfettered discretion in the area of special intelligence activities.
The balance between these claims is often difficult to reach, for the
grants of power to each branch in the Constitution are, to say the least,
fairly nonspecific.
A.

Textual Analysis of the Constitution
1. The Constitution and Congress

The Constitution grants several powers to Congress that create
"an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign
policy ' 172 between the Executive and Legislative branches. Article I of
the Constitution is fairly unspecific, but section 1 of that article provides that "[a]ll legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States . . .-.
The Constitution also allows Congress "[to] provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States"; 74 "To declare
War";7 5 "To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the
land and naval Forces"; 71 "To provide for calling forth the militia,"
and to have control over the public purse. 7 Congressional partisans
argue that these clauses, together with other powers such as control of
commerce between nations, 8 contain significant congressional power in
the area of foreign affairs and constitute an important basis for over7' This Comment's analysis of congressional power does not include the letters of
marque clause. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 11. It is a dead power, for no letter has
been issued by Congress for over 120 years. Furthermore, privateering was ended by
international agreement in the Declaration of Paris in 1856. For a different analysis of
the clause's contemporary relevance, see Lobel, Covert War and Congressional Authority: Hidden War and Forgotten Power, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1034 (1986).
72 E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENCY: OFFICE AND POWERS 201 (5 Rev. ed. 1984).
73 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
74 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
715Id. el. 11.
76 Id. cl. 14.
7 Id. cI. 1.
78 Id. cl. 15. For example, commerce has long been defined as being beyond mere
trade, but is actually "intercourse." See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189
(1824). The limits of the commerce power are unknown, but are as vast as any of
Congress's domestic powers. The commerce power may well be an adequate basis for
an impressive array of legislation relating to foreign relations. See id. at 193 (every
"species of commercial intercourse between the United States and foreign nations" is
within the ambit of Congress).
"' For general discussion of Congress's power over foreign affairs, see H. CAR-
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sight of both collection and special intelligence activities.80
Despite its seemingly vast power, Congress has historically relied
on the power of the purse to enforce oversight preferences.8 1 Article I,
section 9, clause 7 states that "No money shall be drawn from the
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a
regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all
public Money shall be published from time to time."82 Some past examples of Congress using appropriations to effect its oversight and foreign policy agenda are restrictions placed on CIA assistance to anticommunist forces in Angola 3 , and more recently, to anti-communist
84
forces in Central America.
The Constitution does not expressly grant Congress the power to
investigate in the process of its legislative function. Nonetheless, the
Court has continually ruled that congressional investigative power is
implicit in the power to legislate.85 Quite properly, the Court has not
ROLL, THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS (1958); R. DAHL,
CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY (1950); L. HENKIN, suprd note 70.
" For a general discussion of Congress's oversight powers, see M. OGUL, CONGRESS OVERSEES THE BUREAUCRACY: STUDIES IN LEGISLATIVE SUPERVISION

(1976).

See also Aberach, Changes in CongressionalOversight, 22 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 493-515
(May/June 1979); Turner & Thibault, Intelligence: The Right Rules, FOREIGN
POL'Y, Fall 1982, at 122, 136-38 (suggesting that U.S. intelligence needs a consistent
and stable system of controls).
" According to Karalekas and most informed observers, the control of the purse is
actually the only real leverage-legally or politically-that Congress has with respect
to intelligence oversight. See Karalekas, supra note 15, at 28-29 (noting that the power
of the purse is an extremely blunt, imprecise, and politically expensive weapon).
82 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
11 See International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-329, § 404, 90 Stat. 729, 757-58 (prohibiting assistance of any kind to
organizations conducting military or paramilitary operations in Angola unless expressly
authorized by Congress), repealed by Pub. L. No. 96-533, § 118(a)-(d), 94 Stat. 3141
(1980), repealed by Pub. L. No. 99-83, § 811, 99 Stat. 264 (1985).
8 See Further Continuing Appropriations Act for 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-377,
§ 793, 96 Stat. 1830, 1865 (1982); IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 3, at 395-407.
Congress does not have to appropriate funds for all intelligence operations such as
special activities, or it may restrict funds for particular operations. Congress may not,
however, use its control over appropriations to prevent the executive from fulfilling its
constitutionally mandated functions. Cf Swaim v. United States, 28 Ct. Cl. 173, 221
(1893) ("Congress may increase the Army, or reduce the Army, or abolish it altogether;
but so long as we have a military force Congress can not take away from the President
the supreme command. . . . Congress can not in the disguise of 'rules for the government' of the Army impair the authority of the President as commander in chief.").
85 See Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 506 (1975)
(holding that a subcommittee's investigation concerned a subject on which legislation
could be enacted); Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 291 (1929) (holding that
power of inquiry is essential to the legislative function); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273
U.S. 135, 174-175 (1927) (noting that "[a] legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation
is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess
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limited Congress to the drafting and passing of legislation, but rather,
broadly construes the legislative mission to include the power to investigate and oversee matters of potential legislative concern. In Watkins v.
United States, the Court held that broad power to conduct investigations is "inherent in the legislative process." 6 Indeed, the Court has
consistently reaffirmed its view that Congress has broad power to investigate, stating that "[t]he scope of [Congress's] power of inquiry, in
short, is as penetrating and far reaching as the potential power to enact
and appropriate under the Constitution. 81 7 Congress's power to investigate areas of potential legislative concern is not, however, unlimited.
For example, Congress cannot investigate "matters which are within
the exclusive province of one of the other branches of the
Government."8 "
Congress's broad legislative power, combined with its power to declare war, provide for the national defense, control commerce between
nations, and control the public purse, give it ample justification to conduct extensive oversight of the Executive's intelligence activities. For
example, it has been argued that since special activities frequently entail the potential involvement of U.S. troops in armed hostilities with
foreign countries, Congress's power to declare war entitles it to be fully
informed of all such activities.8 9 Similarly, the fact that a special activity may entail the use of military equipment or the involvement of military personnel, also supports Congress's right to be informed of such
activities.90 Finally, Congress's broad legislative power justifies "monitoring the activities of the Executive both in terms of its compliance
with existing law, and to identify areas where new laws may be
needed. Special activities on occasion raise such concerns."9 "
In sum, Congress's right to oversee the Executive's conduct of intelligence activities is rooted in the congressional powers enumerated in
the Constitution, and in Congress's broad investigatory power as recognized by the Court.
2.

The Constitution and the Presidency

Article II, granting powers to the President, is far more general
requisite information").
88

354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).

Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111 (1959).
Id. at 111-12; see also Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986) ("The
Constitution does not contemplate an active role for Congress in the supervision of
officers charged with the execution of the laws it enacts.")
88 See S. REP. No. 276, supra note 28, at 21.
80 See id.
87

8

91 Id.
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than Article I. The President is vested with the executive power over
the national government.92 He is the Commander-in-Chief of the army
and navy;93 he has the power to make treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; 4 he may nominate ambassadors and other public
ministers and consuls;95 he may receive ambassadors and other public
ministers; and he has the power to faithfully execute the laws.9" These
scant few words support the massive global involvement of what was
once considered the most powerful office in the world.
The argument of inherent and plenary Presidential powers in foreign affairs97 is derived from the grant of executive power and Commander-in-Chief clauses. 98 Consistent with the "stewardship theory" of
92 See U.S. CONsT. art. II,
11 See id. § 2, ci. 1.
91 See id. cl. 2.
95 See id.

§ 1, cl. 1.

96 See id. § 3.
11 The argument about what constitutes "inherent powers" versus "express powers" dates back to Washington's Proclamation of Neutrality of 1793. Hamilton, writing
under the pseudonym of "Pacificus," defended the action by stating that the powers and
functions in article II were merely indicative of the powers available to the President
and were not a limiting catalogue of express grants. Madison, responding under the
pseudonym "Helvidius," challenged this interpretation as an attempt to build royalist
prerogatives into the Presidency. See E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT'S CONTROL OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS 7-21 (1917).
The courts have upheld some aspects of Hamilton's notion of inherent powers;
they have supported the principle of the removal power, see Morrison v. Olson, 108 S.
Ct. 2597, 2619-22 (1988), and the President's power to interpret treaties. See Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 706-09 (D.C. Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 444 U.S.
996 (1979) (plurality opinion holding that case was nonjusticiable under political question doctrine).
Even Madison subsequently adopted Hamilton's view when, as President, in a
model of paramilitary covert action, he sent agents to destabilize East and West Florida
in preparation for a congressionally unauthorized military force to gain U.S. control,
despite peaceful relations between the U.S. and Spain. See A. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER 264-65, 291-317 (1976).
98 See Covert Hearings,supra note 22, at 248-49 (memorandum for the Attorney
General on the President's constitutional powers with respect to intelligence activities).
Special activities "are among the most sensitive and vital aspects of the President's
constitutional responsibilities in the field of foreign relations," and they "lie[] at the
very heart of the President's executive power." See Statement of Assistant Attorney
General Charles Cooper, Before the Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, on S. 1721,
December 11, 1987 at 6 (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
The Congress has a somewhat different interpretation. "With repsect [sic] to the
Executive, this authority [in the area of national security] flows from his responsibility
as Commander-in-chief and from the power to make treaties and appoint ambassadors.
The authority of the Executive to conduct intelligence activities, including special activities, has been implied as a necessary extension of these responsibilities." S. REP. No.
276, supra note 28, at 20.
The difference between these two interpretations is not insignificant. The refusal
to accept an expansive reading of the Executive clause is to be expected, since the
ramifications for reducing or eliminating congressional powers in a variety of fields
would be enormous. Conversely, by arguing that the President's authority with respect
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the presidency first set forth by Theodore Roosevelt," the claim is
made that the executive power is circumscribed only by limits expressly
contained in the Constitution itself, and "such statutory limitations as
the Constitution permits Congress to impose by exercising one of its
enumerated powers. The President's executive power includes, at a
minimum, all the discretion traditionally available to any sovereign in
its external relations, except insofar as the Constitution places that discretion in another branch of the government." 0
It follows that if the Executive has such broad and sweeping powers over foreign affairs, then intelligence activities are at the core of this
grant since they are necessary for the formulation of foreign policy and
the safeguarding the country from surprise attack."0
This conclusion comports with Hamilton's view of the need to
provide for unforeseeable exigencies that would require energy, secrecy,
and dispatch in the Executive Branch. 0 2 John Jay even went so far as
to explicitly link intelligence activity with the President's need to operate with secrecy and dispatch.
It seldom happens in the negociation of treaties of whatever
nature, but that perfect secrecy and immediate dispatch are
sometimes requisite. There are cases where the most useful
intelligence may be obtained, if the persons possessing it can
be relieved from apprehensions of discovery. Those apprehensions will operate on those persons whether they are actuated by mercenary or friendly motives and there doubtless
are many of both descriptions, who would rely on the secrecy
of the president, but who would not confide in that of the
senate, and still less in that of a large popular assembly. The
convention have [sic] done well therefore in so disposing of
to intelligence activities derives solely from the Commander-in-Chief and treaty clauses,
Congress's role in intelligence matters is greatly enhanced. Specifically, such an approach, while suggesting collection activities are closer to an Executive function leaves
congress authority and responsibilities for covert action. The President can command
only those forces authorized by Congress, and can make treaties only with the advise
and consent of the Senate. This would imply a great congressional role in regulating
special activities. See id. at 20-21; infra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
" Roosevelt argued that the brevity of powers explicitly granted to the presidency
in the Constitution was meant to reserve to the President all powers not explicitly
granted to Congress by the Constitution or by constitutionally permissible legislation.
See T. ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT; AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 394-97, 504

(1913).

100

Covert Hearings, supra note 22, at 249.

The Court has not explicitly endorsed a similar view of the relationship between intelligence activities and the president's foreign affairs powers but has used language not too removed from this position. See infra notes 104-08.
102 See THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 471-72 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
101
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the power of making treaties, that although the president
must in forming them act by the advice and consent of the
of intellisenate, yet he will be able to manage the business
10 3
gence in such manner as prudence may suggest.
3.

The Court's Interpretation of the Dispute

The Supreme Court has over the years also recognized some presidential plenary power to conduct foreign affairs. In United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,1 04 Justice Sutherland, writing for the
Court, noted the existence of "very delicate, plenary and exclusive
power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in
the field of international relations-a power that does not require as a
basis for its exercise an act of Congress .... "105 Justice Sutherland,
himself a former senator, understood the meaning of granting the President status as the country's sole organ in foreign affairs. Sutherland
Id. No. 64, at 434-35 (J. Jay) (emphasis added).
299 U.S. 304 (1936). Curtiss-Wrightis frequently misread by those who wish
to minimize the President's foreign affairs power. The case is often interpreted as an
affirmation of congressional powers because the Court upheld a joint resolution supporting the President's prohibition of weapon sales to a South American war zone.
Viewed in this way, the Court's treatment of the President's foreign affairs powers is
reduced to dicta and therefore has no precedential value. See L. Fisher, supra note 22,
at 5-8 (noting that Curtiss-Wrightis really an affirmation of congressional power and
that Sutherland's language is irrelevant dicta); cf. Covert Hearings, supra note 22, at
281 (arguing for congressional right to prior notice despite "judicial dicta regarding
inherent presidential authority in foreign affairs"). The actual issue involved, however,
was an excessive delegation of congressional powers. See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at
315. The New Deal era saw the Court strike down several congressional actions for
excessive delegation. The congressional resolution in question before the Court was like
those struck down earlier: broad and vague. To uphold this action, the Curtiss-Wright
Court focused on the difference between presidential domestic and foreign affairs
powers.
The Court essentially realized that the statute clarified any confusion of the President's authority to enforce the embargo within the country. The Court thus adopted a
bifurcated analysis of congressional and presidential powers, with different scope and
reach in domestic and foreign affairs. Thus, the Court's treatment of the President's
foreign affairs powers is crucial to the Court's holding. This case should be properly
read as affirming presidentialpowers in foreign affairs-independent of the Congress.
105 Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320; see also Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 109 (1948) (referring to the President as the
"Nation's organ" in the realm of foreign affairs). The notion of the President as the
"sole organ" in the field of foreign affairs reaches back to Hamilton and his Federalist
Paper writings. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 102, No. 74, at 505 (A. Hamilton)
("The qualities elsewhere detailed, as indispensible in the management of foreign negotiations, point out the executive as the most fit agent in those transactions."); see also
Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319 (quoting address by John Marshall to the House of
Representatives on March 7, 1800, in which he said that the "President is the sole
organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign
nations").
103

104
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added:
It is quite apparent that if, in the maintenance of our international relations, embarrassment-perhaps serious embarrassment-is to be avoided and success for our aims
achieved, congressional legislation which is to be made effective through negotiation and inquiry within the international
field must often accord to the President a degree of discretion
and freedom from statutory restriction that would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved. Moreover, he,
not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions that prevail in foreign countries, and especially is
true in time of war. He has his confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic consular
and other officials. Secrecy in respect of information gathered
by them may be highly necessary, and the premature disclosure of it productive of harmful results."0 6
The basic dichotomy between domestic and foreign affairs powers
of the President and Congress that relies upon the President's role as
the nation's sole organ has not been repudiated. 10 7 Naturally, Congress
is not foreclosed from all regulation of foreign affairs, and certainly it is
entitled to receive information about the Executive's conduct in that
field. l08 The question remains, however, how far may Congress extend
its oversight powers before it poses an unconstitutional interference
Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320.
See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (citing Justice Sutherland's language in Curtiss-Wright).
108 See supra notes 71-91 and accompanying text. When the secrecy of foreign
affairs information sought by Congress is deemed vital to the national security, the
President may refuse to provide Congress with the information, claiming that the material is subject to executive privilege. Decisional authority has established the President's
power to determine the extent of the need to maintain the secrecy of material touching
on areas of national security and foreign policy. In United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683 (1974), the Court for the first time addressed the issue of executive privilege in the
context of an interbranch dispute. It rejected the President's claim of absolute immunity
to withhold information based on that privilege. See id. at 706 (noting that there is not
"an absolute, unqualified Presidential Privilege"). The Court recognized that
"[n]owhere in the Constitution . . .is there any explicit reference to a privilege of
confidentiality, yet to the extent this interest relates to the effective discharge of a President's powers, it is constitutionally based." Id. at 711. Nevertheless, the Court adopted
the Curtiss-Wright bifurcated approach: with regard to domestic matters, the extent of
privilege is limited. For example, in a criminal context, the extent of executive privilege
is narrow and must yield to the "right to the production of all evidence at a criminal
trial [which also has] constitutional dimensions." Id. at 711. In the context of foreign
affairs, the Court recognized a broad "claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or
sensitive national security secrets," id. at 706, to which the judiciary has "traditionally
shown the utmost deference to Presidential responsibilities." Id. at 710.
10'

107

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT

1988]

with the Executive's discretion over foreign affairs?
Given this claim of plenary and exclusive executive powers in the
field of foreign affairs and intelligence activities in particular, any congressional attempts to restrict or interfere with executive discretion in
intelligence activities are seen as an infringement on executive power.
As members of the Executive Branch testified before the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence:
[T]here may be instances where the President must be able
to initiate, direct, and control extremely sensitive national security activities. We believe this presidential authority is
protected by the Constitution, and that by purporting to
oblige the President, under any and all circumstances, to
notify Congress of a covert action within a fixed time, [the
proposed legislation] infringes on this constitutional prerogative of the President ....

A President is not free to commu-

nicate information to Congress if to do so would impair his
ability to execute his own constitutional duties. Under some
circumstances, communicating findings to Congress within [a
prescribed time limit] could well frustrate the President's
ability to discharge those duties.1"'
B.

Balancing Oversight Against Intelligence: How FarMay
Congress Go?
1. Two Tests for Violations of Separation of Powers

There are two general approaches to determining whether a particular statute offends the doctrine of separation of powers. The first
line of analysis, followed in Morrison v. Olson,"O Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,' and Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor," 2 dictates that when the statute in question does not
increase the power of one branch at the expense of another, the court
must determine whether the law "impermissibly interfer[es] with" the
3
performance of the constitutional functions of the other branch." If
the court finds such an impermissible interference, then a balancing test
109 S. REP. No. 276, supra note 28, at 19-20 (testimony of Assistant Attorney
General Charles Cooper) (emphasis added); see infra text accompanying notes 136-41
(giving an example of one such circumstance that compelled DCI Turner to withhold
congressional notification in the interests of national security and preservation of life).
11 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2620-21 (1988).
, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).
112 478 U.S. 833, 851-58 (1986).
113 Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2622.
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may be necessary to weigh the interests furthered by the statute against
the burden placed upon the other branch. 14
The second test, enunciated in Immigration & Naturalization
Service v. Chadhal 5 and Bowsher v. Synar,"81 is based upon formalistic notions of separation of powers analysis and forbids one branch
from usurping the power or responsibilities of another branch.117 For
example, in Chadha, the Court held that Congress may not take action
that has the purpose or effect of "altering the legal rights, duties, and
relations of persons" outside the Legislative Branch unless the constitutional mechanisms for passing laws are observed." 8 Similarly, in Bowsher, the Court stated that it is unconstitutional for an agent of Congress "to be entrusted with executive powers."" 9
In the case of congressional oversight provisions designed to give
Congress information about the Executive's intelligence activities, the
proper approach is functional balancing, i.e., to ask whether the oversight mechanism impermissibly interferes with the Executive's conduct
of intelligence activity. It is evident from the language of the 1980 Intelligence Oversight Act, as well as the several proposals to modify the
oversight mechanism, 1 0 that Congress is seeking to enforce its right to
receive information. At the same time, the Act of 1980 reflects the efforts of the Congress to avoid any explicit encroachment upon executive
See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 443.
116 462 U.S. 919, 951-59 (1983).
a 478 U.S. 714, 726-27, 734 (1986).
114

See id. at 727; Chadha, 462 U.S. at 958-59.
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952.
Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 732.
120 Since the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-450, § 501, 94
Stat. 1975, 1981-82 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 413 (1982)), Congress has recognized the
Executive's ability to initiate special activities without prior notice. Nonetheless, Congress has placed limits on executive nondisclosure. See 126 CONG. REC. 13,125 (1980)
(statement of Sen. Huddleston) ("Section 501(b) [of the Oversight Act of 1980] recognizes that the President may assert constitutional authority to withhold prior notice of
covert operations .... "). Congress also placed limits on how long the President may
withhold notice.
The President shall fully inform the intelligence committees in a timely
fashion of intelligence operations in foreign countries, other than activities
intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence, for which prior notice
was not given under subsection (a) and shall provide a statement of the
reasons for not giving prior notice.
Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-450, § 501(b), 94 Stat. 1975, 1982
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 413(b) (1982)).
Reform proposals have removed the vague "timely fashion" requirement and substituted a clear-cut 48-hour provision. See, e.g, H.R. 3822, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987) (written findings to be reported to Congress within 48 hours). This recommendation apparently is a by-product of the Iran-Contra affair. See IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 3, at 423 (recommending a requirement that the President notify
Congress no later than 48 hours after approving a finding for covert action).
117

"x
"a
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power. 2 1 Since Congress has publicly claimed that oversight in general,
and prior notice in particular, are designed merely for informational
and consultative purposes 122 and do not involve approval or permission, 123 oversight does not usurp the Executive's mission or constitutional prerogatives.1

24

The question thus becomes whether the notice requirements impermissibly interfere with the President's ability to conduct intelligence
activity. As this Comment demonstrates below, the language requiring
prior notice-or allowing after-the-fact notice only within a rigid timeframe"-impermissibly interferes with the President's power to conduct intelligence activity, and is therefore unconstitutional.
2.

Congressional Oversight as Impermissible Interference

Under the incidental effects test followed in Morrison, Schor, and
Nixon, the constitutionality of prior notice requirements, or defined
statutory time limits for after-the-fact notice, turns on whether such a
scheme "'impermissibly undermine[s]' the power of the Executive
Branch, or 'disrupts the proper balance between the coordinate
branches [by] prevent[ing] the Executive Branch from accomplishing its
constitutionally assigned functions.' "126
a. The Confidential Nature of Intelligence Activity
The executive functions affected by Congressional intelligence
oversight measures are extremely sensitive to publicity. In performing
121 See Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-450, § 501, 94 Stat.
1975, 1981-82 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 413 (1982)). The Act contains the significant
language specifying that notice requirements apply only "[t]o the extent consistent with
all applicable authorities and duties, including those conferred by the Constitution upon
the executive and legislative branches of the Government" and recognizing that there
may be instances when prior notice is not given. See id. § 501(a), (b).
122 But see supra note 14 (describing congressional leaks of classified intelligence
activities); infra notes 163-64 and accompanying text (same).
122 See Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-450, § 501 (a)(1), 94
Stat. 1975, 1981 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 413(a)(1) (1982)) ("[T]he foregoing provision
shall not require approval of the intelligence committees as a condition precedent to the
initiation of any such anticipated intelligence activity . . . ."); S. 1721, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1988) (seeking to amend the Oversight Act of 1980 to provide that "nothing
contained in this title shall be construed as requiring the approval of the intelligence
committees as a condition precedent to the initiation of [intelligence] activities"); H.R.
3822, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (same).
214See S. REP. No. 276, supra note 28, at 24.
12 The time limit is forty eight hours in S.1721 and H.R. 3822. See S.1721,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) (amending § 503(a)(1) of the Act); H.R. 3822, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (same).
126 Morrison, 108 S.Ct. at 2621 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Nixon, 433 U.S. at
443).
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the Executive's intelligence functions, intelligence agencies constantly
deal with information that must remain confidential in order to prevent
harm to the security and safety of the nation, its allies, and individuals
whose lives are at risk because of intelligence operations. The Court,
recognizing the importance of this responsibility, has acknowledged the
Executive's substantial latitude in the conduct of foreign affairs. 12 7 The
Executive's control over confidential information relating to national security is also interpreted broadly. 2
Congressional requirements for prior notice impermissibly interfere with the President's ability, and indeed his obligation, to safeguard
and preserve confidential national security information. "Prior reporting would reduce the president's flexibility to deal with situations involving grave danger to personal safety, or which dictate special re'
quirements for speed and secrecy." 129
Legislation imposing a rigid
timetable for after-the-fact notification would be equally burdensome.
In Morrison, the Court concluded that there was no impermissible
interference with the Executive under an incidental effects test because
"the [Ethics in Government] Act does give the Attorney General several
means of supervising or controlling the prosecutorial powers" of the
independent counsel.' 30 The Court decided that "these features of the
Act give the Executive branch sufficient control . to insure that the
President is able to perform his constitutionally assigned duties," while
noting that such a prosecutor has greater freedom from executive supervision than other prosecutors. 3' Thus, the central basis for the
Court's decision to uphold the Ethics Act in Morrison was the legisla32
tion's minimal interference with an inherent executive power.'
The intelligence function is also an inherent power,133 but the interference caused by rigid notice requirements is much greater than the
interference in Morrison. Under the proposed oversight legislation,'
127

See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.

128

See supra note 108.

129

National Intelligence Act of 1980: Hearings before the Senate Select Comm.

on Intelligence, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1980) (prepared Statement of Admiral Stansfield Turner).
131

Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2621.

131Id.

at 2622.

Similarly, in Schor, the Court held that initial administrative adjudication of
claims and counterclaims under the Commodity Exchange Act did not "impermissibly
undermin[e]" the powers of the judiciary, Schor, 478 U.S. at 856-57, and in Nixon, it
approved an act directing the Administrator of General Services to take control of
Nixon's papers, and preside over their dissemination, finding that this did not prevent
"the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions."
132

Nixon, 433 U.S. at 443.
133

234

See supra notes 103-09 and accompanying text; supra note 121.

See supra note 12.
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the Executive Branch surrenders necessary flexibility in the intelligence
field to withhold prior notice or notice beyond the fixed time frame on
the basis of national interest. While the legislation, on its face, disavows
any prior approval of executive action, the existence of stringent reporting requirements necessarily impairs the President's plenary authority
to exercise his role as the nation's sole organ in foreign affairs. This is
tantamount to approval of only those operations that can be safely communicated to Congress within the legislatively imposed time frame.
There will almost certainly be some highly sensitive operations and activities that the President will determine to be in the national interest,
and such provisions will render these operations infeasible by preventing the Executive branch from acting with "secrecy and dispatch."
b.

The "Canadian Caper"

A recent historical example demonstrates the magnitude of congressional interference and serves to illustrate the practical implications
of this debate. In 1979, Iranian students seized fifty-two hostages in the
American embassy in Tehran. Unknown to the Iranians, and the rest
of the world, six other Americans were hidden at the Canadian embassy. 135 The Canadian government agreed to hide the Americans until
a covert exfiltration operation could be organized to ensure their safe
passage out of Iran, but only on the express condition that the President allow access to the information on a strict "need-to-know" basis,
and refuse to notify Congress.' 86 The Canadians feared that a leak
would result in the seizure of their embassy.
The rescue operation took three months to organize and carry out
and the six Americans were safely returned home.137 Congress was informed-but only after the operation had extricated the Americans
from Iran. In order to save American lives and honor the pledge given
to Canada, Admiral Turner and President Carter postponed notification of the eight congressional committees until the rescue mission was
See Covert Hearings, supra note 22, at 46.
136 See Oversight Legislation, 1987: Hearings on S.1721 and S.1818 Before
the Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, 100 Cong., 2d Sess. 209 (1988) [hereinafter
Hearings] (testimony of Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, former DDCI under
Stansfield Turner) ("[T]he Canadians indicated that if the Congress was to be informed, they wouldn't cooperate."). Senator Jim McClure has also stated that "[t]he
Canadians said they would not help unless the administration promised not to notify
Congress." See McClure, A 48-Hour Rule For Covert Operations? No, Wash. Post,
Sept. 26, 1988, at All col. 5. Admiral Turner, however, has stated that "I don't really
recall that clearly." Telephone Interview with Stansfield Turner, former DCI (Oct. 7,
1988).
137 See Covert Hearings, supra note 22, at 61.
135
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successfully completed.1 38 In doing so, however, they violated the
Hughes-Ryan Act, which required notification to the eight committees
of Congress about the covert action." 9
This so-called "Canadian Caper" demonstrates how an unconditional statutory requirement to inform Congress within a fixed period
of time can interfere with the Executive's conduct of his foreign affairs
power. The time required for necessary preparations could not have
been dictated or even predicted; the mission could not have been undertaken if the short, rigid notification provision had not been violated. In
fact, in Iran the CIA did not even have any assets in place; one operative, code-named "Bob," had to be coaxed out of retirement to start
building an exfiltration network in Iran from scratch. 4 Operatives
that entered Iran did so on several occasions to reconnoiter the scene,
and the information they retrieved had to be evaluated extensively.
Only after all this was completed, could the placement of operatives
into Tehran to assist the exfiltration begin-a process that involved
grave personal risks to the operatives and those Iranians who assisted
them. Once the operatives were in place, it remained impossible to impose a strict timetable that would permit a low-risk notification to Congress. Had the President notified Congress within the statutory time
period, he would not have been able to justify undertaking the rescue
operation.
In the "Canadian Caper" case, the burden not to divulge the operation was placed on the President by a foreign power. While the same
problem regarding life or the need for total secrecy can arise out of
strictly domestic concerns, the action by the Canadian government
should not be seen as a unique event. The Executive branch constantly
interacts with foreign states that are leery of surrendering secrets or
188 See Hearings, supra note 136, at 220. Carlucci stated, "Now we did inform
after the fact." He added, however, "I was one of the decision-makers [to withhold
notification to Congress] and I would not have [given prior notice], in retrospect. Because I think those people would still be there had we not agreed to withhold information." Id.
18 See The Hughes-Ryan Amendment, Pub. L. No. 93-559, § 662, 88 Stat.
1795, 1804 (1974) (requiring "timely notice" to the appropriate committees of Congress), amended by The Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-450,
§ 407(a), 94 Stat. 1975, 1981 (incorporating id. § 501, 94 Stat. at 1981-82 (codified at
50 U.S.C. § 413 (1982))). The 1980 Act requires prior notice as a general rule, and
requires that the appropriate committees of both houses be informed in a "timely fashion" when prior notice is not given. See Covert Hearings,supra note 22, at 1-2 (opening statement of Rep. Matthew F. McHugh); supra notes 62-64, 120-21 and accompanying text.
140 See J. RANELAGH, supra note 13, at 652, 655 (noting that an exfiltration
network is not the same as a general collection network; the former is specialized and
must remain ad-hoc to keep it from getting rolled up by local counterintelligence).
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confidences.14 1 Foreign powers or operatives, knowing that participation with the United States in a special activity requires rigid congressional notification procedures, may well refuse to extend their assistance. " In this way, rigid notification requirements interfere with the
President's ability to conduct foreign affairs, since they deny him the
ability to receive such assistance. This legislation thus "impermissibly
undermine[s]" the powers of the executive branch 4 and "prevents the
Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions." 4 ' While the legislation may on its face disavow any prior approval of executive action, the existence of the statute will necessarily
impair the President's plenary capacity to exercise his role as the nation's "sole organ" in foreign affairs. This is tantamount to an a priori
congressional approval of only those operations that can be communicated to Congress within the legislatively imposed time frame.
The above analysis does not reject the premise that Congress has a
right to receive information about intelligence activity. The intelligence
oversight dispute centers 145 on when Congress is entitled to receive such
information. The intelligence process requires flexibility between the
two branches in order to safeguard the President's prerogatives and the
nation's security.
The result may be that Congress will not receive information until
after the fact-as in the "Canadian Caper." Congress will likely find
this inconvenient for some of its oversight desires.1 4 ' But, as the Court
stated in Bowsher, "the fact that a given law or procedure is efficient,
141 See Hearings, supra note 136, at 212-213 (statement of former DDCI and
Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci). "I don't know how many times when I was in
the CIA cooperating intelligence organizations expressed their concern on this subject.
Certainly it was numerous. They will frequently tell you that we will give you this
information providing it does not go to your Congress." Id. According to Carlucci, this
is because the U.S. deals with nations that "don't always understand our institutions,
that have different institutions of their own. . . . and are basically mistrustful of the
dissemination of information beyond the Executive branch." Id. at 217; cf.supra note
103 and accompanying text (argument by John Jay that some may trust the President
to keep secrets, but are less likely to trust the Senate, and even less so the House).
142

See NationalIntelligence Act of 1980: Hearings on S. 2284 Before the Sen-

ate Select Comm. on Intelligence, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1980) (testimony of Admiral
Stansfield Turner); see also Hearings, supra note 136, at 201. According to Secretary
of Defense Carlucci, a former chief of West German intelligence stated that proposed
oversight legislation "would prevent any allied intelligence service rendering any assistance to the United States on covert action." Id. Former DDCI and DDO John McMahon has also stated "that a number of nations would refrain from supporting us for
fear that their association might become public." Id. at 246.
143 Schor, 478 U.S. at 856.
144 Nixon, 433 U.S. at 443.
145 See supra notes 39-58 and accompanying text.
148 See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text (argument by the Senate that
legislative oversight requires knowledge of all special activity).
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convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing
alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution. Convenience
and efficiency are not the primary objectives-or the hallmarks-of
democratic government . . .
The conclusion that rigid notification requirements impermissibly
interfere with executive functions does not end the constitutional analysis. Once an impermissible interference is found, the interests furthered
by the statute must be weighed against the burden placed on the Executive.' 8 Thus, Congress's right to be informed immediately must be
weighed against the Executive's interest in the activity in question.
C.

A Functional Balancing Test

This Comment proposes that a balancing test must be used to examine each case in a functional manner. As demonstrated above, Congress's constitutional right to inflexibly demand information is somewhat qualified in the intelligence area.'4 9 Congress should be given
wider latitude, however, with respect to activities that are closer to the
related penumbra of congressional grants of power.
The clearest case for a congressional right for statutorily defined
notice is the case of a paramilitary operation, such as Operation White
Star in Indochina or the Contras in Honduras. A functional balancing
test would weigh on one side, the strong congressional interests in (1)
whether a state of war might result; (2) the impact on the Army and
Navy-in terms of both personnel and equipment; and (3) whether
laws were or are being violated.' 50 These concerns would then be balanced against the Executive's interest in secrecy, dispatch, and his ability to conduct foreign affairs.' 5 ' While a strict requirement of prior
notice or timely notice after the fact might interfere with the Executive,
a balancing of interests would probably conclude that such a requirement would be constitutional. The Executive could initiate action without fear of hinderance and would maintain both secrecy and dispatch.
Congress's oversight interests would also be met.
Application of a functional balancing test to other types of special
activity does not result in similar outcomes. For example, consider an
exfiltration situation similar to the Canadian case. Applying the same
Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 736 (quoting Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944).
See Schor, 478 U.S. at 856; Nixon, 433 U.S. at 443.
149 But cf. Covert Hearings, supra note 22, at 191 (statement by Rep. Shuster
that Congress has a "right to have . . . certain information" (emphasis added)).
160 See S. REP. No. 276, supra note 28, at 21; supra notes 36-51 and accompanying text.
...See supra notes 92-103 and accompanying text.
147

148
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notice requirements invokes the same congressional interests, such as
investigating that laws were not broken, a state of war might result, or
the impact on the armed forces. Yet, in the balance, in an exfiltration
situation, these same congressional interests are not as pressing and
thus weigh less in the scale when compared to the Executive's interests.
Congressional concerns do not require prior notice or some arbitrarily
defined time period. Given the Court's precedent giving "the utmost
deference" to the Presidency in the sphere of national security, 1 52 the
same notification requirements that would be constitutional in a
paramilitary situation are an unconstitutional interference in an exfiltration episode.
A separate, hypothetical, example might help clarify the distinction further. As described earlier, special activity can include the covert
rendering of assistance to foreign labor movements or newspapers. 53
Consider pre-martial law Poland. The U.S. has a HUMINT asset
serving within the Polish security services in a collection mode. Learning of a possible impending crack-down by the Polish government from
this source, his U.S. control directs the asset to participate in the decisionmaking process either to deflect a decision towards U.S. aims or
gain time to facilitate covert American financial or technical assistance
to Solidarity. Technically, this HUMINT asset has now become part
of a special activity, yet the exact time when the operation commences
becomes ambiguous. When does Congress need to know? When the
plan is conceived? When his orders are transmitted (and given the vagaries of tradecraft, who knows when received)? Once his participation
begins? The same type of balancing test would weigh congressional interests and the relevant congressional constitutional powers, with the
presidential need to move with speed and stealth. Again, the same congressional interests and powers invoked in the paramilitary example do
not support the assertion that Congress must be informed about this
operation within a statutorily defined time period. This is particularly
so when the cooperation of foreign powers or assets, eager to remain
anonymous (at least until the operation is over), is contingent on nonnotification.
As an interesting observation, this use of a functional balancing
test also argues against congressional imposition of notice requirements
in the area of clandestine collection.15 This is true not only in the area
See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974).
See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
154 Congress has not sought to include collection efforts within its various timely
notice schemes. In fact, both the 1980 Oversight Act and current reforms all mention
that they do not apply to "necessary collection". See 50 U.S.C. § 413(a)(1)(A) (1982).
152
153
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of HUMINT operations, when the risk to human life and foreign cooperation is clear, but also in the direction of "national technical
means" and other ELINT/SIGINT assets, when potential targets, if
alerted, may change their posture to frustrate the intended collection
effort. Proponents of congressional oversight so far have not sought to
impose restrictions on collection, but refrain from doing so by strictly
linking collection activities to direct grants of presidential power, the
naming of ambassadors and the receiving of foreign diplomats. 5 Congressional proponents will be opposed to the use of a functional test, for
though it supports the same conclusion with respect to collection, it
defeats the purpose of their ingenious argument-to limit presidential
power by strictly construing Article II and conversely giving Article I a
broad reading concerning special activity.
The proposed functional balancing test is not a legal fiction
designed to shield the Executive from congressional scrutiny. The test,
as proposed, does not deny the necessity or legality of congressional
oversight, for Congress must be notified of the activity. The argument
is that legislation such as S. 1721 or H.R. 3822 is unconstitutional because it does not permit flexibility based on a discrete functional analysis, but demands prior notice or notification within a fixed time period
for all special activities. This legislation treats all special activity as if it
were the constitutional and legal equivalent of paramilitary activity.
Recently, Congress has begun to assert strongly its oversight powers. In this and the previous Section, the constitutional limits on Congress's rights to demand information have been defined, while also articulating when and why the Executive has a right to withhold
information. Part Three proposes a compromise solution within the legal extremes discussed previously. This proposal protects the President's constitutional role, yet also preserves Congress's legitimate need
to oversee the intelligence process for appropriations and to ensure that
laws are not being violated. Changes in the Intelligence Oversight Act
will permit Congress to monitor Executive Branch activity in order to
prevent circumstances similar to the Iran-Contra incident, while preserving the Executive's secrecy and dispatch.
155

See, e.g., S. REP. No. 276, supra note 28, at 20 (accepting "the view that

where the Constitution gives the President independent and exclusive authority to
act-for example, the power to 'receive ambassadors and other public ministers'-Congress cannot deny him ... from carrying out such activities"); Covert Hearings, supra note 22, at 219-220 (letter by Louis Henkin explaining why collection
activities are different from special activity with respect to congressional oversight); see
also supra note 98.
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III. A

MORE INTELLIGENT APPROACH TO INTELLIGENCE
OVERSIGHT

A.

Policy and Compromise

So far, this Comment has focused on the constitutionality of various intelligence oversight mechanisms. But the revelation that rigid
time-notification requirements will often violate the doctrine of separation of powers does little to guide policymakers in their formulation of
a legal and effective oversight mechanism. Reconciling the current approach to oversight with the need to preserve flexibility requires compromise from both the Executive and Legislative Branches. Such an
approach, emphasizing the need for cooperation, will accommodate the
various institutional interests of the Congress, the Executive, and the
intelligence community. 15 6
In order to improve intelligence oversight while enhancing the
quality of intelligence activity in the field, an approach must be both
accountable and flexible. The 1980 Oversight Act was helpful, but little
more than a step in the right direction. Staid legal rigidity that threatens the system with gridlock and breakdown must be eliminated and
reformation of the process pursued along a twin-track: (1) changes in
the statutory basis for oversight and (2) modifications in the oversight
structure itself.
1. A Sliding Scale of Risk
The current trend toward ossification of oversight into discrete,
discernable, but unrealistic legal categories of "timeliness," is not only
unconstitutional but impracticable. Instead of seeking to create ironclad notice requirements, Congress can preserve the constitutionality of
its oversight legislation and insure performance by seeking a flexible
standard that prevents the abuses associated with non-accountability
while preserving the operational effectiveness of the intelligence
community.
An acceptable solution requires Congress to recognize that, by nature, intelligence operations entail risk. Adoption of a notice standard
based on a graduated scale of risk would provide the necessary flexibility for oversight while preserving the Executive's inherent and plenary
'"1 Cf Covert Hearings,supra note 22, at 45 (statement of former DCI Turner,
noting that "good will and cooperation between the Executive Branch and the two
congressional committees on intelligence may be more important than written agreements or provisions of law").
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powers in the realm of foreign affairs.""7
The mechanism is simple. Under a sliding scale procedure, the
President notifies Congress of the initiation of a covert operation (just
as in existing legislation and proposed reforms) with a Memorandum
of Notification ("MON"). The President, however, states in the MON
that the details of the operation cannot yet be divulged."" Instead, he
invokes the procedure to define timeliness based on risk. The docket at
the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence would register
the MON, but, unlike other special activities that have their own program element ("PE") funding, approved by the intelligence committees,
this MON would use the congressionally created and authorized DCI
contingency fund. As a means of preventing the Executive from misusing this device-for example, by initiating covert paramilitary action
without adequate notice to Congress-the funds available for such a
MON could be limited either by the total dollar amounts available or
by the number of drawdowns permitted for a single operation. Once
the risk was judged to be sufficiently reduced, the Executive would file
a supplementary explanation giving the reason for withholding notification and giving an accounting for the funds expended.
To use the example discussed earlier, under this scheme, in a scenario similar to the "Canadian Caper," the DCI would file a MON
with Congress, notifying it of the commencement of the operation. He
would not mention the target country, the nature of the operation (in
157

See Covert Hearings, supra note 22, at 58. Former DCI Turner stated:

[T]imeliness is not measured by a clock. Timeliness should be measured
by the risk....
So I don't think we should focus on hours and days. I think we
should focus on diminution of the risk. It could be that as an operation
goes along the risk to human life drops off but the operation under the
Finding is still continuing. That would be the point at which the Executive should come to Congress. When that risk to human life is diminished
sufficiently is when it is timely to notify the Congress in my opinion, sir.
Id. Former DCI Colby has argued that even non-life-threating situations may also be
valid reasons for withholding Congressional notice. See id. at 59.
158 Cf id. at 145 (statement by Lloyd Cutler) (noting that the DCI would be
asked about the operation by the committee every time he appeared for funds and required to give reasons for denying details to Congress).
This compromise proposal has the attraction of giving Congress prior notice but
addressing some of the security qualms advanced by the intelligence community. According to Cutler,
[T]hen after time, the DCI comes up to testify, you will be asking him
what was that operation, and why can't you tell us? Sooner or later, as
long as you know that something is happening, eventually you will find
out and it is the finding out and requiring him to account I think is more
powerful than the consultation earlier.
Id. at 149.
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this case exfiltration), or the number of persons involved. The DCI's
Contingency Fund drawdowns for an operation of this sort would not
approach the level necessary to train, equip, and supervise an army in
the jungles of Laos or Honduras. After the hostages were safe from
harm, the DCI would then file a supplementary MON providing the
details of the operation and explaining the request of the foreign government (but not necessarily giving the actual country's name) and the
risk both to human operatives and the hostages themselves. An appendix with the accounting of funds would complete the process. Should
Congress believe the risk mechanism was abused, it could then legislate
changes in access to the contingency fund to prevent similar operations
from using the risk mechanism.159
It should be emphasized that the use of a scale of risk is based on
the premise that only the most pressing circumstances would warrant
its use. Congress is today already receiving prior notice of the vast majority of intelligence operations.' 00 A notice requirement based upon a
sliding scale of risk would not give the DCI carte-blanche authority to
abuse appropriations. First, restrictions on the DCI's contingency fund
ensure some control over scale and operational objectives. Given these
financial reins and the realities of modern reporting-which make sustained paramilitary programs almost impossible to hide from the public
eye-Congress would know from the start that the sliding scale process
would be limited to the most discrete operations. 6 ' Furthermore, once
the level of risk is reduced, Congress can demand a full accounting of
expenditures, or if need be, raise the issue to the political fora for debate with the Executive. In response to any improper use of the sliding
scale mechanism, Congress can always pass restrictive legislation simi159 Stansfield Turner is opposed to the idea of placing limits on the DCI's access
to the contingency fund in cases in which risk prevents notification. "I wouldn't want to
limit a DCI by this kind of scheme. There seems to be no sense in going in by way of a
back door. The key goal is to eliminate this kind of maneuvering by establishing the
necessary trust between Congress and the President." Telephone interview with Stansfield Turner, former DCI (October 7, 1988).
180See Gates, The CIA and Foreign Policy, 66 FOREIGN AFF. 215, 224 (1987-88)
(noting that, in the majority of cases, Congress is as well informed about intelligence
activities as the Executive).
"81 That is, even beyond the financial controls preventing a paramilitary or similar operation, operations that have a high "noise" quotient are singularly ill-suited for
the sliding scale risk system. These are also precisely the types of operations about
which Congress would like to have prior notice. Given the violence involved in
paramilitary operations, and the requirements of potential operations that require muscular staffing either in the field or in logistics, use of the risk non-disclosure device is
sure to be at best merely a temporary reprieve from public knowledge and congressional investigation. Beyond the fiscal control over the contingency fund, the political
costs of such a misuse and its inevitable exposure are a powerful incentive for executive
cooperation.
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lar to the Boland Amendment."6 2 Congressional pressure of this sort
should prove to be a proper disincentive for executive abuse of the
process.
2.

Modifying the Congressional Oversight Mechanism

If more flexible statutory language is required, a further step
would be to address structural concerns with the present oversight
mechanism in Congress. The most important concern is the lack of adequate congressional security. 6 There are domestic164 and counterintelligence aspects to this issue.
While information leakage is a hot partisan political controversy,
it is a minor problem when compared to the problem of foreign infor162 Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-377, § 793,
96 Stat. 1830, 1865 (1982). This is admitting, though, that the whole premise of the
risk system-cooperation and compromise-failed.
.63 Congress has historically been a source of information leaks. As far back as the
War for Independence, the Continental Congress fired Thomas Paine, the author of
Common Sense, after he disclosed details of covert French assistance to the colonies. See
IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 3, at 576. Congress leaked the details of the Jay
Treaty between Great Britain and the United States prematurely, despite the presence
of a secrecy injunction. See A. SOFAER, supra note 97, at 96-97. The Pike Committee
leaked a copy of its secret report to the Village Voice in 1976. See L. JOHNSON, supra
note 8, at 189-91. In 1972, Senator Gravel, without advance notice, read into the CongressionalRecord excerpts from a top-secret National Security memorandum concerning proposals to mine ports in North Vietnam. See A. MAASS, CONGRESS AND THE
COMMON GOOD 241 (1983). Congressman Zablocki allegedly personally leaked antiQuaddafi operations to Newsweek. See B. WOODWARD, supra note 6, at 158-60. Former Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee David Durenburger publically
leaked information about CIA operations in a certain Middle East country. Engelberg,
Senator is Quoted As Saying U.S. Recruited Israeli Officer as a Spy, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 21, 1987 at A3, col 2. Referring to Senator Durenburger's behavior, House
Speaker Jim Wright stated before the House Committee, "I don't have the faintest idea
who that would be. I appreciate your keeping his identity secret." Id. Ironically,
Wright himself has trouble keeping secrets. He may have doomed effective legislative
changes in oversight by provoking criticism and an ethics investigation into his public
statements on CIA activity in Nicaragua. See Rasky, Congress: Walking a Tightrope
on Intelligence Activities, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1988, at A26, col. 1.
164 As far as domestic leaking is concerned, it is true that Congress currently has
only 2,500 personnel with security clearances, as opposed to 2.2 million in the executive
branch and military. See H. Hyde, "Leaks" and Congressional Oversight 4 (on file
with the University of PennsylvaniaLaw Review). It is also true that a Senate Intelligence Committee study stated that journalists listed congressional sources for leaks eight
to nine percent of the time, but referred to the administration 66 percent of the time.
See id. If the intelligence committee's numbers are accurate, Congress, with only 0.1
percent of total clearances, is responsible for eight to nine percent of national security
leaks. See id. These data have led some to make charges of congressional propensity to
leak, claiming that "on average, a cleared person in Congress is 60 times more likely
than his counterparts elsewhere to engage in unauthorized disclosures." Id. Although
reliance on politicized statistics is dangerous, the argument points out the need to become aware of perceived security problems.
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mation gathering. In the order of priority for Soviet KGB activity, the
Intelligence and Armed Service Committees of Congress are actually
listed higher than the CIA.16 5 As an example of Soviet interest, when
the Soviets responded to the overtures of former CIA officer David Barnett, his Soviet control steered him from a CIA position in favor of the
Senate Intelligence Committee. 6
The solution to both leaking and Soviet penetration is to reduce
the number of staff who have access to sensitive compartmentalized information ("SCI") and to tighten background checks, including study
on how Congress may effectively use polygraphs.1 67 Currently, both
committees together include thirty-two members of Congress, four exofficio members, and fifty-eight staff members.1 6 8 A Joint Intelligence
Committee should be established in order to facilitate better security
and a more harmonious relationship with the intelligence community. 169 A Joint Committee would make security easier, reduce the validity of executive branch reluctance to share information with a
"leaky" Congress and establish a more coherent congressional approach
to intelligence.
Critics of the Joint Committee proposal charge that a Joint Com165See W. CORSON & R. CROWLEY, THE NEW KGB: ENGINE OF SOVIET
POWER 357 (1985) (noting that, for the Soviets, Congress is a far more attractive penetration target than the CIA). Congress does not have as stringent screening and vetting
procedures, for its employees are not polygraphed. Furthermore, the CIA is highly
compartmentalized, unlike the committee structure in Congress. Finally, unless the Soviets have access to the proper decisionmaking level in the CIA, most of the information
they gain will be of limited use, compared to what they might get from the Hill. But
see Cohen, Congressional Oversight of Covert Activities, 2 INT'L J. INTELLIGENCE
AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

155, 161-62 (1988) (Sen. Cohen refuting the idea that

the Senate Select Committe on Intelligence has lax security measures).
16 See W. CORSON & R. CROWLEY, supra note 165, at 356 (noting that when
Barnett was offered a contract position with the CIA, his assigned case officer, Vladimir Popov, was displeased; Popov proposed and encouraged Barnett to seek a job with
either the House or the Senate Intelligence Committee).
187 There are legitimate rejoinders to the imposition of polygraphs on the Hill.
First, polygraphs are useful only when the examination takes into account the institutional values about personnel. There may be significant problems in having a polygraph administered by an agency or personnel unfamiliar with the peculiar congressional ad-hoc personnel, and structural requirements. Furthermore, Congress can
rightly point out that while the CIA and NSA regularly "flutter" their personnel, the
National Security Council and the State Department, for example, do not. At least one
Senator wished to have the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence staff polygraphed.
See Hearings,supra note 136, at 216 (statement by Senator Hecht); see also Hyde &
Lungren, Tightening Up the Hill's Loose Lips, Wash. Post, June 2, 1987, at A19, col.
2 (noting that "[n]o members or congressional staff are subject to polygraph either as a
screening process or during a leak investigation").
188 See Hyde & Lungren, supra note 167, at A19.
189 See H.J. Res. 48, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (providing for establishment of
a Joint Committee on Intelligence); see also TOWER COMMISSION, supra note 9, at V6 (advocating a single congressional oversight committee).
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mittee would be less effective, 170 and argue that separate staffs would
be more likely to achieve a more comprehensive control over information than a unified committee. Why this would be so remains unclear,
particularly since separate staffs did not preclude the House Committee's knowledge of the Nicaraguan mining, while the information was
not communicated to their Senate colleagues. If the membership of the
committee is sufficiently calibrated to ensure senior House and Senate
participation, thereby lending institutional prestige, the unified staff
should have the necessary clout to effectively oversee the intelligence
community. The actual basis for the complaint seems to be narrow institutional interests of the Senate and House, with each chamber reluctant to cede status and other perks.17 1
B.

ConsolidatingExecutive Oversight

Clearly, the Iran-Contra episode revealed flaws in the executive
management of the intelligence community.1 72 Within the executive
170 See Boren & Cohen, Keep Two Intelligence Committees, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17,
1987, at A17, col. 3 (noting that the single Joint Atomic Energy Commission was
unable to overcome the problem of leaks).
...One often voiced concern is that such a committee will become a "captive" of
the intelligence agencies it is supposed to oversee. First, if the current practice of limiting terms and revolving memberships continues, it is unclear why this argument would
be stronger with a single joint committee than the current arrangement. Secondly, it is
not at all clear that a certain degree of "cooption" is necessarily a bad thing. George
Pickett, a former budget and program analyst for the SSCI has noted that even some
degree of "capture" did not diminish the impact of the intelligence committees. See
Pickett, Congress, the Budget and Intelligence, in POLICY AND PROCESs, supra note 1,
at 172-73.
..
2 There are -two aspects to the collapse of executive oversight in the Iran-Contra
initiative. One is a breakdown in already established procedures and the other is the
absence of a sufficient oversight mechanism for the entire intelligence community in the
executive branch.
Central to the procedural lapses was the failure to adhere to practices regarding
"findings." Findings are documents created by the executive branch to justify the execution of a special activity to Congress in order to secure Congressional funding of the
operation. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text (detailing how the HughesRyan Amendment created the first requirement for a finding in order to secure congressional funds for covert operations). In the Iran-Contra episode, actions were taken
with no findings, post-dated findings, or other procedural irregularities. See IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 3, at 378-81 (describing the slipshod nature of Executive
finding procedures). It would be a mistake to exaggerate these lapses, however, for "[i]n
fact, the committees have received advance notification of every presidential finding but
for the two involving the attempted rescue of our hostages in Iran in 1979-80 and the
NSC initiative in 1985 and 1986." Covert Hearings,supra note 22, at 176 (statement
of David Doherty, General Counsel, CIA).
In response to reports of sloppiness, the President issued a national security directive, ordering that "[n]o special activity may be conducted except under the authority
of, and subsequent to, a Finding by the President that such activity is important to the
national security of the United States." See National Security Decision Document
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branch, the strongest potential oversight mechanism for the entire intelligence community rests predominantly with the Department of Justice.
In the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, the Counsel for Intelligence Policy is responsible for a variety of activities, ranging from overseeing applications for foreign electronic surveillance (FISA),' 7 monitoring intelligence and counterintelligence activities by executive branch
agencies to insure conformity with Department objectives, and participating in the development, implementation and review of intelligence
policies, including procedures for the conduct of intelligence and
counterintelligence activities.17 4
While the potential for extensive oversight in this office and elsewhere in the Justice Department exists, the department's clout with the
intelligence community has varied considerably. Under Carter's Executive Order 12,036, the Attorney General had wide-ranging authority in
the realm of intelligence, but since 1981, the influence of that office has
diminished.17 5 In fact, even when the attorney general was present during intelligence deliberations, representatives from the intelligence community insisted he was there in his personal-not professional-capacity, and refused to allow his assistants to attend. 1' This
decline should be reversed, since the Executive lacks a broad oversight
mechanism that is familiar with law, Congress, and the intelligence
community. Intelligence professionals can rightfully mistrust the call
for even more lawyers to become involved, but the question is not how
many lawyers are involved, but at what level. The recommendation
here is to get legal advice at the top that can save operations, careers,
and the nation from embarrassment-or worse.
Furthermore, the current President's Intelligence Oversight Board
(PIOB),'1 a three-member panel drawn from outside the governNSDD-286, issued March 31, 1987 (declassified extract on file with the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review). The directive also ordered that all findings be made in
writing and signed by the President except in extraordinary situations, when the finding would be written as soon as possible. See id.
171 See Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-11

(1982).
"I See 28 C.F.R. § 0.33 (1988).

See ABA

EVALUATION, supra note 11, at 15-16.
See Willard, Law and the National Security Decision-making Process in the
Reagan Administration, 11 Hous. J. INT'L L. 129, 132 (1988) (noting that other
players were permitted subordinates, but that Attorney General Meese was denied both
subordinates and recognition that he attended because he was Attorney General). The
result of the cumulative restrictions on Department of Justice input on intelligence
questions "was to minimize the ability of the Attorney General to participate in the
deliberations or to render meaningful legal advice." Id.
1 See Executive Order Number 12,334, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,955 (1981). The PIOB
is distinct from another mechanism, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board ("PFIAB"). The PFIAB is composed of prominent citizens who serve at the
175

178

612

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 137:571

ment 7 8 and working in the White House, must be strengthened."' 9
The PIOB traditionally has not been influential, lacking the necessary
staff, access, and bureaucratic prestige to carry out a sustained oversight
mission successfully. 8 0 The President has been ill-served by this inefficiency, as demonstrated by the Iran-Contra incident. The PIOB should
be strengthened with a permanent legal staff and revitalized with a
wider mandate in a successor executive order to Executive Order Number 12,334. One way to ensure greater prestige and more clout would
be to require those serving on the PIOB to do so full-time; Senate confirmation would also serve to raise visibility and enhance clout by placing members' qualifications, intelligence perspectives, and values into
the public record.
The consolidation of decisionmaking elites in both houses of Congress into joint committees, the adoption of a sliding scale of notice
based upon risk, and more stringent executive procedures for intelligence oversight are all compromises; each branch must make concessions to create a more stable atmosphere for intelligence management
and oversight efficiency. These improvements will not eradicate completely the various bases of conflict or charges of abuse. This new regime does, however, move away from the legal fetishism of recent years
and places the resolution of oversight problems where it squarely belongs: in the flexible process of political accommodation and
compromise.
pleasure of the President. The PFIAB is charged with monitoring the performance,
organizations, personnel, collection, or evaluation of intelligence within the intelligence
community. In reality, it is highly political. As Martin Anderson has revealed, many of
the prominent and busy people selected to the PFIAB do not have time to monitor the
intelligence community adequately. When the board does take its oversight mission seriously, it may find itself replaced with a more pliant group. See Anderson, Through
the Looking Glass, COMMON CAUSE MAG., July-Aug. 1988, at 13, 16. The PFIAB is
sadly lacking in power and prestige. See id. Anderson notes that PFIAB chairman
Anne Armstrong fought a losing battle for the respect of the major defense figures, such
as Casey, Haig, and Schultz. Board members regarded her with "a mixture of toleration and amusement." Id. The important defense figures often delayed their responses
to the board, leading to inefficient communication; "recommendations of the board were
being implemented slowly, if at all." Id.
178 See ABA EVALUATION, supra note 11, at 17.
179 Reestablished by Exec. Order No. 12,334, supra note 179, the PIOB is
charged with (1) overseeing the legality of intelligence activities, see Miller, Advisory
and Oversight Panels on Intelligence Named, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1981, at A27, col.
1; (2) "inform[ing] the president of intelligence activities which any member of the
board believes are in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States." ABA
EVALUATION, supra note 11, at 17; (3) monitoring the performance of the inspectors
general and general counsels of the intelligence community; and (4) conducting investigations that it deems necessary and reporting violations to the Attorney General. See id.
180 See Silver, supra note 5, at 14 (noting that the PIOB consists of part-time
members and has virtually no staff).
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CONCLUSION

We have an opportunity for a reappraisal of the direction intelligence oversight has taken in the brief decade-and-a-half since its conception. Looking forward, the impulse may be to consider potential
structural and statutory changes in response to the immediate historical
precedent of the Iran-Contra incident. Such parochial solutions, however, may fail to establish general oversight conditions applicable in
nonaberrant situations. Outside the Iran-Contra incident, the compromise system embedded in the 1980 Oversight Act has worked fairly
well. It should be strengthened, not discarded.
The oversight mechanism is not and cannot be a panacea for
resolving tensions concerning the proper deployment of intelligence assets in support of American foreign policy. Neither analysis of constitutional text, resort to decisional authority, nor the citing of historical
precedent will help draft statutes that will resolve the fundamental policy differences that have historically confounded the process. Policy
compromise must be accomplished in traditional open fora of political
debate. A new approach can expedite the political process by removing
the need to resort to legal formalism, a device previously used to
achieve policy preferences unobtainable by other means.
The nation needs an effective intelligence capability. The United
States has global commitments and challenges that require unprecedented flexibility and efficient integration of all resources. An effective
intelligence capability is central to America's success in fulfilling its
geopolitical responsibilities and maintaining its security. The United
States cannot walk away from this reality without assuming grave
risks. As one statesman said to another republic over 2,400 years ago,
"It may have been wrong to take [the empire]; it is certainly dangerous
to let it go." 181
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(quoting Pericles).
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